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1. Introduction	
Political	favoritism	describes	situations	in	which	politicians	“allocate	[goods	and	services]	
disproportionately	 to	 population	 subgroups,	 variably	 identifiable	 by	 race,	 ethnicity,	 or	
partisanship”	 (Golden	 and	 Min,	 2013,	 p.74).	 Jointly	 with	 corruption,	 political	 favoritism	
constitutes	 a	major	 political	 risk	of	 government	 intervention	 (Glaeser,	 2012).	Because	of	
political	favoritism,	spending	allocations	deviate	from	the	normative	principles	that	should	
otherwise	 guide	 them,	 reducing	 citizen	 welfare	 and	 hampering	 economic	 growth1.	
Likewise,	party	favoritism	describes	situations	in	which	officials	affiliated	to	the	incumbent	
party	are	able	to	attract	disproportionate	benefits	from	the	public	budget.	Representatives	
of	the	majority	party	in	parliament	might	obtain	more	local	public	goods	for	their	districts,	
while	 co‐partisan	 mayors	 might	 receive	 more	 intergovernmental	 transfers.	 In	 all	 these	
cases,	 “…	 hierarchical	 networks	 of	 party	 ofﬁcials	 (factions)	 work	 to	 direct	 local	 public	
goods	to	their	constituencies	and	thereby	win	votes	and	advance	their	careers	within	the	
party”	 (Persico	 et	 al.,	 2011,	 p.	 242).	 In	 other	words,	 lower‐level	 politicians	 obtain	more	
resources	 from	a	 fellow,	higher‐level	party	official	because	 they	are	expected	 to	help	her	
retain	 office,	 and	 they	 are	 happy	 to	 provide	 support	 at	 election	 time	 as	 they	 too	 have	
expectations	of	future	promotion.		
But	how	can	political	favoritism	be	curbed?	It	is	an	old	assumption	that	governments	
are	held	accountable	to	the	citizens	through	the	electoral	process.	Citizens	select	politicians	
and	 decide	 to	 retain	 or	 oust	 them	 after	 a	 period	 in	 office.	 An	 incumbent’s	 desire	 for	 re‐
election	should	ensure	that	she	does	not	deviate	from	the	constituents’	interests	and	focus	
on	 too	 narrow	 a	 segment	 of	 the	 population.	 However,	 this	 only	 holds	 true	 if	 certain	
conditions	are	met.	For	example,	Hodler	and	Raschky	(2014)	show	that	regional	favoritism	
(i.e.,	 the	 tendency	to	benefit	 the	political	 leader’s	region	of	birth)	 is	stronger	 in	countries	
with	weak	political	institutions	and	low	education	levels.	There	is	also	some	evidence	that	
information	 and	 political	 participation	 help	 curb	 ethnic	 favoritism	 (see	 Fujiwara	 and	
Wantchekon,	 2013).	 And,	 more	 importantly	 as	 far	 as	 this	 paper	 is	 concerned,	 several	
studies	 suggest	 that	 political	 favoritism	 flourishes	when	 there	 are	 no	 elections	 or	 when	
elections	 are	 uncompetitive.	 Clear	 evidence	 of	 this	 is	 provided	 by	 Burgess	 et	al.	 (2015),	
who	show	that	ethnic	favoritism	as	reflected	in	expenditure	on	road	building	in	Kenya	was	
high	 in	 autocratic	 periods,	 but	 disappeared	 in	 periods	 with	 free	 elections.	 Similarly,	
Trounstine	(2006)	shows	that	U.S.	city	mayors	facing	un‐contested	elections	tend	to	target	
core	supporters	at	the	expense	of	the	larger	community	when	allocating	public	spending.		
                                                 
1	For	example,	ethnic	favoritism	has	been	identified	as	a	major	impediment	to	development	in	Africa	
(Easterly	and	Levine,	1997).	Other	authors	have	documented	the	negative	effect	of	favoritism	on	aid	
effectiveness	(Dreher	et	al.,	2010)	and	on	stimulus	spending	(Wright,	1973).	
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In	 this	 paper,	 we	 examine	 the	 effects	 of	 electoral	 competition	 on	 party	 favoritism	
when	allocating	earmarked	capital	transfers	to	local	governments.	We	consider	this	setting	
to	be	highly	suited	to	the	study	of	party	favoritism	and	its	relation	to	electoral	competition,	
for	several	reasons.	First,	intergovernmental	transfers	of	this	kind	are	especially	vulnerable	
to	party	 favoritism.	These	 transfers	provide	 funds	 that	have	 to	be	spent	 in	a	very	 limited	
range	 of	 areas	 as	 determined	 by	 the	 grantor.	 Sometimes,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 capital	
transfers	studied	here,	they	are	assigned	to	a	specific	infrastructure	project,	whose	design	
and	 budget	 must	 be	 approved	 prior	 to	 execution,	 thus	 providing	 scope	 for	 political	
manipulation.	Second,	these	transfers	fund	services	that	are	the	joint	responsibility	of	two	
layers	 of	 government2.	 This	 means	 that	 voters	 have	 to	 split	 any	 political	 credit	 for	 the	
service	or	facility	financed	between	two	incumbents.	When	a	co‐partisan	(the	opposition)	
controls	local	government,	a	transfer	enhances	(reduces)	the	popularity	of	the	mayor	while	
reducing	(enhancing)	that	of	the	opposition	candidate	(see	e.g.,	Arulampalam	et	al.,	2009).	
This	means	that	 intergovernmental	transfers	can	be	used	to	help	co‐partisan	mayors	win	
competitive	 races.	 The	 higher‐tier	 incumbent	 is	 interested	 in	 such	 an	 outcome	 since	 it	
provides	 a	 pool	 of	 loyal	mayors	 that	 can	 provide	 support	 in	 future	 electoral	 races	 (e.g.,	
mayors	 can	 help	 to	 win	 the	 party	 nomination	 or	 to	 mobilize	 the	 electorate	 during	 a	
campaign)	or	who	can	be	recruited	 for	higher	office.	Third,	 incentives	 to	engage	 in	party	
favoritism	can	also	depend	on	how	close	the	higher‐level	election	race	is.	When	the	higher‐
tier	 incumbent	 is	 at	 risk	 of	 losing	 an	 immediate	 election,	we	 can	 expect	 her	 to	 focus	 on	
strategies	that	are	more	productive	in	the	short	run,	such	as	targeting	constituencies	with	
many	swing	voters3.	Only	when	the	incumbent	 feels	electorally	safe	will	she	implement	a	
long‐run	 strategy	 of	 building	 up	 a	 pool	 of	 loyal	mayors	 that	 can	 provide	 support	 in	 the	
future,	when	her	political	advantage	might	not	be	that	great.	
The	 goal	 of	 this	 paper,	 therefore,	 is	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 amount	 of	 party	
favoritism	shown	in	the	allocation	of	 transfers	to	 local	governments	 is	not	so	great	when	
the	 higher‐layer	 government	 (i.e.,	 the	 grantor)	 faces	 contested	 elections4.	 We	 present	 a	
simple	 theoretical	model	 that	 predicts	 this	 heterogeneous	 effect.	 In	 the	model,	 a	 higher‐
level	 incumbent	 allocates	 transfers	 to	 local	 governments	 aimed	 at	 maximizing	 her	
probability	 of	 staying	 in	 power.	 The	 incumbent	 has	 to	 decide	 whether	 to	 allocate	more	
                                                 
2	This	 is	the	case,	 for	example,	of	 the	capital	 transfers	we	analyze	–	 local	governments	design	and	
implement	the	project	and	provide	part	of	the	funds	and	regional	governments	select	the	projects	
based	on	their	own	policy	priorities	and	provide	co‐funding	for	them.	
3	 The	 literature	 on	 pork‐barrel	 politics	 has	 traditionally	 focused	 on	 other	 tactics,	 namely,	 the	
targeting	of	spending	to	either	‘swing’	(e.g.,	Lindbeck	and	Weibull,	1987,	and	Dixit	and	Londregan,	
1995)	or	‘core’	supporter	districts	(e.g.,	Cox	and	McCubbins,	1986).	The	literature	is	inconclusive	as	
to	which	tactic	is	more	prevalent	(see	Golden	and	Min,	2013,	for	a	review).		
4	Other	papers	have	analyzed	the	effect	of	electoral	competition	on	fiscal	outcomes	(e.g.,	Besley	and	
Case,	2003,	and	Besley	et	al.,	2010)	and	on	rent	seeking	(e.g.,	Svaleryd	and	Vlachos,	2009).	
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transfers	 to	 co‐partisan	 mayors	 facing	 close	 elections	 (and,	 thus,	 increase	 the	 pool	 of	
aligned	 mayors)	 or	 to	 spread	 the	 money	 across	 all	 districts	 in	 order	 to	 maximize	 her	
probability	 of	 re‐election.	When	 higher‐level	 elections	 are	 uncompetitive,	 the	 incumbent	
uses	her	advantage	to	pursue	the	first	objective5.		
We	test	the	model’s	predictions	using	information	on	capital	transfers	from	regional	
to	local	governments	in	Spain.	Several	papers	to	date	have	documented	the	fact	that	party	
favoritism	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 intergovernmental	 transfers	 is	 quantitatively	 important.	
Using	U.S.	data,	Grossman	(1994),	Larcinese	et	al.,	(2006)	and	Berry	et	al.	(2010)	find	some	
evidence	 that	 states	 and	 districts	 aligned	 with	 the	 federal	 government	 do	 receive	more	
funds6.	Arulampalam	et	al.	(2009)	quantify	this	difference	as	representing	16%	in	the	case	
of	 federal‐to‐regional	 transfers	 in	 India.	 Diaz‐Cayeros	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 find,	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Mexico,	 that	 under	 the	PRI,	 the	 states	 controlled	by	 this	party	 received	up	 to	40%	more	
transfers	than	those	controlled	by	the	opposition.	Similarly,	Solé‐Ollé	and	Sorribas‐Navarro	
(2008)	and	Brollo	and	Nannicini	(2012)	examine	capital	transfers	to	local	governments	and	
report	increases	of	around	30	and	40%	for	Spain	and	Brazil,	respectively.		
However,	 none	 of	 these	 papers	 studies	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 higher‐
level	 elections	 nor	 do	 they	 provide	 any	 evidence	 as	 to	 why	 a	 given	 degree	 of	 party	
favoritism	is	observed7.	One	reason	for	this	might	be	that	these	papers	use	data	for	a	single	
high‐tier	 government	 (usually	 the	 federal	 government	 during	 one	 or	 a	 few	 elections),	
making	 it	 impossible	 to	 estimate	 heterogeneous	 effects.	 In	 this	 paper,	we	make	 use	 of	 a	
newly	 compiled	database	on	 transfers	 from	Spanish	 regional	 governments	 (the	 so‐called	
Autonomous	Communities,	ACs	 from	now	on)	during	 three	 terms	of	office	 for	more	 than	
2,000	 Spanish	 municipalities.	 Thus,	 we	 analyze	 whether	 party	 favoritism	 depends	 on	
certain	 characteristics	 presented	 by	 the	 ACs	 and,	 in	 particular,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 test	 the	
hypothesis	 that	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 regional	 incumbent	 losing	 office	 does	 genuinely	
matter.	 Spain	 is	 particularly	 well	 suited	 to	 studying	 this	 question,	 given	 that	 there	 is	
substantial	variability	in	the	intensity	of	electoral	competition	at	the	regional	level.	In	some	
ACs	 (e.g.,	 Castilla‐León),	 the	 incumbent	 party	 has	 held	 power	 uninterruptedly	 for	 many	
years	and	by	a	large	margin,	so	the	perceived	risk	of	electoral	defeat	is	low;	in	others	(e.g.,	
                                                 
5	 A	 similar	 dynamic	 trade‐off	 is	modelled	 in	 Joanis	 (2011).	 In	 that	 paper	 the	 incumbent	 decides	
whether	to	target	‘swing’	voter	districts	to	win	the	present	election	or	‘core’	voter	districts	to	keep	
loyal	voters	motivated.	
6	In	the	US,	alignment	between	governors	and	the	president	has	also	recently	been	shown	to	matter	
in	the	assignment	of	responsibility	on	economic	policy	(see	Geys	and	Vermeir,	2014).	
7	Likewise,	only	a	few	papers	examine	the	effect	of	electoral	competitiveness	on	pork	barrel	politics:	
Ansolabehere	and	Snyder	(2006)	analyze	whether	the	tendency	to	favor	‘core’	over	‘swing’	districts	
in	the	U.S.	is	mediated	by	state‐level	electoral	competition,	but	find	no	evidence	of	this;	and	Joanis	
(2013)	looks	at	the	effects	of	electoral	competition	on	the	allocation	of	revenues	for	roads	in	Canada	
and	also	finds	no	effect.	
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the	Balearic	 Islands)	power	has	changed	hands	 frequently	and	the	winning	margins	have	
typically	been	narrow.	
In	order	 to	 identify	 the	effect	of	party	 favoritism,	we	use	a	 regression	discontinuity	
design	(RDD)	for	close	elections,	comparing	municipalities	in	which	the	ideological	bloc	of	
the	 regional	 incumbent	won	or	 lost	 the	previous	 local	 election	 by	 a	 narrow	margin.	 The	
effects	 estimated	 in	 some	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 papers	 (employing	 either	 OLS	 or	
‘difference‐in‐differences’	methods)	might	 be	 biased	due	 to	 the	omission	of	 time‐varying	
electoral	 support	 for	 the	 incumbent.	 Brollo	 and	 Nannicini	 (2012),	 Migueis	 (2013)	 and	
Bracco	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 improve	 on	 this	 by	 using	 a	 RDD,	 as	 is	 now	 customary	 in	 papers	
examining	the	effects	of	parties	on	policy	outcomes	(see,	e.g.,	Lee	et	al.,	2004;	Pettersson‐
Lidbom,	2008,	and	Ferreira	and	Gyourko,	2009).	An	 important	methodological	novelty	of	
our	paper	is	that	we	adapt	the	RDD	to	a	proportional	representation	(PR)	electoral	setting.	
Employing	RDD	in	a	PR	system	is	challenging,	but	a	number	of	recent	studies	have	clearly	
established	 the	steps	 to	 follow	(see	Folke,	2014,	 for	 the	seminal	paper,	and	also	Ade	and	
Freier,	2013,	Fiva	et	al.,	2015,	and	Fiva	and	Halse,	2016).	We	follow	these	papers	and	define	
our	 treatment,	 i.e.,	 alignment,	 as	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	 ideological	 bloc	 to	 which	 the	
regional	 president	 belongs	 has	 a	majority	 of	 seats	 in	 the	 local	 council.	We	 use	 a	 forcing	
variable	based	on	a	calculation	of	 the	number	of	votes	that	 that	regional	president’s	bloc	
must	lose	(gain)	at	the	local	election	in	order	to	lose	(gain)	the	majority	of	seats	on	the	local	
council.	 The	 idea,	 as	 in	 the	 conventional	 RDD	 close‐election	 literature,	 is	 that	 local	
governments	with	aligned	mayors	backed	by	a	 coalition	 that	won	 the	marginal	 seat	by	a	
few	 votes	 (the	 last	 seat	 required	 needed	 to	 secure	 the	 majority)	 should	 be	 similar	 to	
unaligned	mayors	backed	by	a	coalition	that	lost	the	marginal	seat	also	by	a	few	votes.	One	
difference	with	 the	 previous	 literature	 on	 close‐election	 RDDs	 in	 PR	 systems	 is	 that	 we	
derive	 an	 exact	 algebraic	 formulation	 for	 our	 forcing	 variable,	 instead	 of	 relying	 on	
simulations.	We	believe	 that	our	procedure	works	as	well	 as	 those	described	previously,	
with	the	added	advantage	that	it	is	both	easy	to	implement	and	highly	intuitive.	
What	we	find	is	striking.	The	RDD	estimates	suggest	that	Spanish	local	governments	
controlled	 by	 the	 same	 party	 as	 the	 regional	 government	 receive	 on	 average	 92%	more	
funds	for	earmarked	capital	transfers	than	are	received	by	similar	municipalities	controlled	
by	 the	opposition.	These	results	 represent	unequivocal	evidence	of	an	extreme	degree	of	
party	 favoritism	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 capital	 transfers.	 The	 alignment	 effect	 found	means	
that,	 on	 average,	municipalities	 could	 increase	 their	 capital	 spending	by	20%.	Obviously,	
this	effect	could	be	much	 larger	 for	small	municipalities	with	low	fiscal	capacity	that	rely	
more	 heavily	 on	 transfers	 to	 fund	 investment.	More	 importantly,	 the	 competitiveness	 of	
regional‐level	elections	 influences	these	biases	 in	the	allocation	of	transfers.	According	to	
our	results,	 the	 level	of	party	 favoritism	for	the	regions	with	 less	competitive	elections	 is	
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much	higher	 (nearly	 twice	 the	 local	 average	 treatment	effect),	while	 the	 treatment	effect	
virtually	 disappears	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 more	 competitive	 regional	 elections.	 This	 effect	
survives	 many	 robustness	 checks	 and	 horse	 races	 against	 alternative	 explanations.	
Moreover,	 although	 a	 simple	 ‘difference‐in‐differences’	 estimator	 delivers	 lower	 average	
treatment	 effects,	 the	 relative	 effect	 of	 regional	 electoral	 competitiveness	 remains.	
Therefore,	 our	 results	 provide	 strong	 evidence	 that	 electoral	 competition	 at	 the	 regional	
level	 mitigates	 the	 degree	 of	 party	 favoritism	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 intergovernmental	
transfers.		
The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	In	the	next	section,	we	present	a	simple	theoretical	
model	that	generates	the	prediction	that	party	favoritism	is	greater	when	regional	elections	
are	 uncompetitive.	 Section	 3	 provides	 the	 institutional	 background	 to	 the	 Spanish	 case.	
Section	4	describes	the	empirical	methodology.	Section	5	presents	the	results	and	the	last	
section	concludes.	
2. Theoretical	framework	
In	 this	 section,	we	present	 a	 theoretical	model	 that	helps	us	derive	our	main	hypothesis:	
when	 the	 regional	 incumbent	 perceives	 a	higher	probability	of	 losing	office	 (i.e.	 electoral	
competition	 is	high),	 the	degree	of	party	 favoritism	in	 the	allocation	of	 transfers	 is	 lower.	
The	reason	our	model	makes	this	prediction	is	that,	when	allocating	transfers	across	local	
municipalities,	 the	 regional	 incumbent	 faces	a	 tradeoff	between	 trying	 to	win	 the	 current	
regional‐level	 election	 and	 maximizing	 the	 number	 of	 aligned	 mayors.	 To	 maximize	 her	
probability	of	winning	the	regional	election,	the	incumbent	must	spread	transfers	across	all	
municipalities,	 while	 to	maximize	 the	 number	 of	mayors	 she	must	 concentrate	 on	 those	
with	 a	 narrow	 majority,	 favoring	 co‐partisan	 mayors	 and	 undermining	 those	 of	 the	
opposition.	When	regional	elections	are	highly	competitive,	the	regional	incumbent	tends	to	
allocate	 transfers	without	discrimination,	with	 the	 aim	of	maximizing	her	 vote.	However,	
when	the	regional	incumbent	feels	safe,	she	can	forget	about	having	to	win	more	aggregate	
votes	 and	 can	 focus	 on	 seeking	 to	 switch	 the	 outcome	 in	 those	municipalities	where	 the	
opposition	have	a	narrow	majority.		
Model	 layout.	 The	model	 comprises	 two	 tiers	 of	 government:	 regional	 and	 local.	We	
assume	 there	 is	 one	 regional	 government	 and	 N	 local	 governments.	 Voters	 at	 separate	
regional	and	 local	elections	select	 the	party	 to	 rule	at	each	 tier	by	choosing	between	 two	
candidates8.	 At	 both	 contests,	 voters	 decide	 whether	 to	 reelect	 the	 incumbent	 (i.e.,	 the	
regional	 president	 or	 the	 mayor,	 depending	 on	 the	 election)	 or	 to	 replace	 her	 with	 the	
challenger.	 In	 making	 such	 decisions,	 voters	 take	 into	 account	 the	 utility	 derived	 from	
                                                 
8	We	treat	these	elections	as	being	concurrent	(i.e.,	both	elections	are	held	on	the	same	day),	since	
this	is	how	they	are	scheduled	in	most	Spanish	regions.		
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transfers	allocated	from	the	regional	to	the	local	government.	Per	capita	transfers	to	local	
government	i	are	denoted	by	 ,	the	voter’s	utility	function	ݑሺ߬௜ሻ	is	assumed	to	be	concave	
(i.e.,	ݑᇱ ൐ 0	&		ݑᇱᇱ ൏ 0)	and	the	marginal	utility	is	assumed	to	be	linear	(i.e.,	ݑᇱᇱᇱ	=0).	
Voters	split	the	credit	from	transfer‐related	utility	between	the	regional	and	the	local	
incumbent	in	proportions	ሺ1 െ ߠሻ	and	ߠ,	respectively	(see	Arulampalam	et	al.,	2009),	with	
0 ൑ ߠ ൑ 1.	 The	 vote	 for	 the	 regional	 incumbent’s	 party	 at	 these	 two	 elections	 in	
municipality	i	can	be	expressed	as	follows:	
																																																				ݒ௜௥,ଵ ൌ ߩ௥ݒ௜௥,଴ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻݑሺ߬௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௥																																														(1a)	
																																																		ݒ௜ℓ,ଵ ൌ ߩℓݒ௜ℓ,଴ ൅ ߠሺ2ܽ௜ െ 1ሻݑሺ߬௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜ℓ																													 		(1b)	
where	 ݒ௜௥,ଵ	 and	 ݒ௜௥,଴	 are	 the	 vote	 margin	 (i.e.,	 the	 vote	 share	 minus	 ½)	 obtained	 by	 the	
regional	incumbent’s	party	in	municipality	i	at	the	regional	elections	(denoted	by	r)	held	in	
periods	1	 (the	next	 election)	 and	0	 (the	previous	 election);	 and	ݒ௜ℓ,ଵ	 and	ݒ௜ℓ,଴are	 the	 vote	
margin	obtained	by	 the	 regional	 incumbent’s	party	 in	municipality	 i	 at	 the	 local	elections	
(denoted	by	ℓ)	held	also	in	periods	1	and	0.	The	coefficients	ߩ௥	and	ߩℓ	measure	the	degree	
of	persistence	of	vote	decisions.	The	terms	ߝ௜௥	and	ߝ௜ℓ	are	random	popularity	shocks	at	the	
regional	 and	 local	 elections,	 respectively,	 distributed	 Nሺ0, ߪ௥ሻ	 and	 Nሺ0, ߪℓሻ,	 which	 are	
assumed	to	be	independent	of	each	other.	
The	term	ሺ1 െ ߠሻݑሺ߬௜ሻ	in	equation	(1a)	captures	the	effect	of	transfers	on	the	vote	for	
the	regional	incumbent	at	the	regional	elections:	voters	are	willing	to	reward	the	regional	
incumbent	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	 utility	 derived	 from	 the	 transfers	 she	 allocated	 to	 the	
municipality,	in	proportion	to	the	responsibility	for	the	quality	of	the	service	attributed	to	
the	regional	government,	measured	by	ሺ1 െ ߠሻ.	The	term	ߠሺ2ܽ௜ െ 1ሻݑሺ߬௜ሻ	in	equation	(1b)	
captures	the	effect	of	transfers	on	the	vote	for	the	candidate	of	the	regional	 incumbent	at	
the	 local	 elections.	 Note	 that	 now	 the	 transfer‐derived	 utility	 is	 multiplied	 by	 the	
term	ߠሺ2ܽ௜ െ 1ሻ,	which	depends	on	the	proportion	of	responsibility	attributed	to	the	local	
government,	 ߠ,	 but	 also	 on	 whether	 the	 local	 and	 the	 regional	 incumbent	 belong	 to	 the	
same	(i.e.,	ܽ௜ ൌ 1ሻ	or	different	parties	(i.e.,	ܽ௜ ൌ 0).	For	a	mayor	belonging	 to	 the	regional	
incumbent’s	 party,	 the	 effect	 of	 transfers	 on	 the	 vote	 at	 local	 elections	 is	 ߠݑሺ߬௜ሻ,	where’s	
when	the	mayor	belongs	to	the	regional	opposition	party	the	effect	of	transfers	is	െߠݑሺ߬௜ሻ.	
For	 the	 regional	 incumbent,	 assigning	 transfers	 to	 a	 local	 government	 controlled	 by	 the	
opposition	will	harm	the	vote	record	of	the	opposition	candidate	at	the	local	elections9.		
We	consider	that	a	regional	incumbent	might	pursue	two	goals.	First,	she	might	seek	
to	 maximize	 the	 probability	 of	 winning	 the	 current	 regional	 election.	 Second,	 she	 might	
want	 to	 maximize	 the	 number	 of	 aligned	 mayors,	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 building	 political	
                                                 
9	 In	 the	 next	 section,	we	 present	 anecdotal	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 these	 credit	 spillovers	 are	 a	
ubiquitous	feature	of	intergovernmental	transfers	in	Spain.	
i
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capital	 and	 increasing	 the	 chances	 of	 winning	 future	 regional	 elections.	 An	 objective	
function	combining	these	two	goals	can	be	expressed	as:	
																							Max
߬௜
൛Prob൫∑ ߩ௥ݒ௜௥,଴௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻݑሺ߬௜ሻ ൐ ߝ௜௥൯ ൅		
																											൅ߟ ∑ Prob൫ߩℓݒ௜ℓ,଴ ൅ ߠሺ2ܽ௜ െ 1ሻݑሺ߬௜ሻ ൐ ߝ௜ℓ൯ െ ܿሺ∑ ߬௜௜ ሻ	௜ 																				(2)	
The	 first	 part	 of	 this	 expression	 is	 the	 probability	 of	 wining	 the	 current	 regional	
election,	which	depends	on	the	summation	of	votes	across	municipalities.	The	second	part	
is	the	number	of	mayors	belonging	to	the	regional	incumbent’s	party,	which	depends	on	the	
summation	 of	 the	 probabilities	 of	 winning	 each	 local	 election.	 The	 parameter	 	 is	 a	
coefficient	 that	depends	both	on	the	amount	of	political	capital	provided	by	a	mayor	(i.e.,	
how	crucial	 it	 is	 to	have	 the	mayors’	support	during	future	regional‐level	campaigns)	and	
on	 a	 discount	 factor	 (i.e.,	 how	 important	 are	 future	 vs.	 current	 regional	 elections	 for	 the	
incumbent).	The	term	ܿሺ∑ ߬௜௜ ሻ	is	a	convex	function	(i.e.,	ܿᇱ ൐ 0	and	ܿᇱᇱ ൐ 0)	that	accounts	for	
the	 opportunity	 costs	 of	 resources,	 and	 the	 marginal	 cost	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 linear	 (i.e.,	
ܿᇱᇱᇱ ൌ 0).	
We	can	express	the	probability	expressions	in	(2)	as:	
																										Prob൫∑ ݒ௜௥,ଵ௜ ൐ 0൯ ൌ Φቀ௩ത
ೝ,బାሺଵିఏሻ∑ ௨ሺఛ೔ሻ೔
√ே ቁ ൌ	Φ௥																																					(3a)	
													∑ Prob൫ݒ௜ℓ,ଵ ൐ 0൯ ൌ௜ ∑ Φ൫ݒ௜ℓ,଴ ൅ ߠሺ2ܽ௜ െ 1ሻݑሺ߬௜ሻ൯ ൌ 	∑ Φ௜ℓ௜ 	௜ 	 															(3b)	
where,	 to	 simplify	 the	 notation,	 we	 set	 ߩ௥=ߩℓ=1	 and	 ߪ௥ ൌ ߪℓ ൌ 1,		 and	 where	 Φ௥	 is	 the	
cumulative	distribution	function	of	∑ ߝ௜௥௜ ,	which,	by	the	convolution	formula,	is	distributed	
as	Nሺ0, √ܰߪ௥ሻ,	and	Φ௜ℓ	is	 the	cumulative	distribution	function	of	ߝ௜ℓ.	Note	that	Φ௥	depends	
on	 the	 average	margin	of	 victory	at	 the	 regional	 elections	 (̅ݒ௥,଴),	while	Φ௜ℓ	does	not.	Note	
also	 that	 while	 Φ௥	 is	 the	 same	 across	 localities,	 Φ௜ℓ	depends	 on	 the	 previous	 margin	 of	victory	in	municipality	i	(ݒ௜ℓ,଴)	and	on	the	alignment	status	of	the	mayor	ሺܽ௜ሻ.	
Results.	Plugging	(3a)	and	(3b)	 into	(2)	and	maximizing	with	respect	 to	i	we	obtain	
the	following	first‐order	condition:	
																											Γ ൌ ൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ ൅ ߟߠሺ2ܽ௜ െ 1ሻ߶௜ℓ൯ݑᇱሺ߬௜ሻ െ ܿᇱሺ߬௜ሻ ൌ 0									 																		(4)	
where	ߤ ൌ 1/√ܰ	and	߶ ൌ Φᇱ	 is	 the	density	 function	of	 the	 standard	normal	distribution.	
This	condition	says	that	the	net	marginal	benefit	of	allocating	transfers	should	be	the	same	
across	localities10.	The	following	results	can	be	derived:	
                                                 
10	 To	 ensure	 that	 this	 is	 a	 maximum,	 we	 need	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 incentives	 arising	 from	 local	
elections	 are	not	 too	great	 relative	 to	 those	arising	 from	 regional	 elections.	This	 ensures	 that	 the	
second‐order	condition	is	always	negative	(i.e.,	both	for	aligned	and	unaligned	municipalities).		
i
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PROPOSITION	1:	Party	favoritism	at	close	 local	elections:	provided	credit	spillovers	exist	(ߠ>0)	
and	mayors’	 political	 capital	 is	 valuable	 (ߟ>0),	 in	 close	 local	 elections	 (i.e.,	when	 ݒ௜ℓ,଴ ൌ 0)	
aligned	mayors	will	receive	more	transfers	than	unaligned	mayors:		
																																																																							߬௔ െ ߬௨ ห௩೔ℓ,బୀ଴ ൐ 0																																																										(5)	
where	a	 stands	 for	 aligned	 and	u	 for	unaligned.	To	understand	why	 this	 is	 the	 case	note	
from	 (4)	 that	 ߶௜ℓ	 is	 multiplied	 by	 ߟߠ	 and	 – ߟߠ	 in	 the	 aligned	 and	 unaligned	 cases,	
respectively,	thus	creating	a	wedge	between	the	marginal	benefits	of	transfers	to	these	two	
types	of	municipality	(see	the	proof	in	the	Appendix).	This	result	was	previously	reported	in	
Brollo	and	Nannicini	(2012),	albeit	with	a	slightly	different	specification11.		
PROPOSITION	2:	Regional‐level	electoral	competition	and	party	favoritism:	the	lower	the	degree	
of	regional‐level	electoral	competition	(i.e.,	the	larger	the	previous	margin	of	victory,	̅ݒ௥,଴),	the	
higher	the	degree	of	party	favoritism	at	close	local	elections:		
																																																																						
డቆఛೌ ିఛೠ หೡ೔ℓ,బసబ
ቇ
డ௩തೝ,బ ൐ 0																																																												(6)																						
This	 occurs	 because	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 marginal	 benefit	 formula	 (i.e.,	 the	 terms	
between	 brackets	 in	 expression	 (4))	 gains	 importance	 as	 ̅ݒ௥,଴	 decreases	 and	 ߶௥		rises.	Intuitively,	as	̅ݒ௥,଴	decreases	the	regional	incumbent	becomes	more	focused	on	winning	the	
regional	election	and	less	focused	on	winning	a	greater	number	of	local	elections.	Because	
of	 this,	 transfers	are	spread	out	 to	all	municipalities,	 independently	of	 the	party	 to	which	
the	 mayor	 belongs12.	 This	 result	 is	 new	 to	 this	 paper	 and	 provides	 the	 main	 empirical	
prediction	we	aim	to	test.		
Hypotheses.	The	model	predicts	that,	when	regional	elections	are	not	too	competitive,	
the	 regional	 incumbent	will	 allocate	more	 transfers	 to	aligned	 than	 to	un‐aligned	mayors	
that	won	the	local	elections	by	a	narrow	margin.	The	model	also	predicts	that	the	lower	the	
level	of	electoral	competition	at	the	regional	level,	the	greater	the	difference	in	the	amount	
of	 transfers	 allocated	 to	 aligned	 vs.	 unaligned	 mayors	 that	 won	 the	 local	 elections	 by	 a	
narrow	margin.		
                                                 
11 The	 model	 also	 predicts	 that	 the	 alignment	 effect	 vanishes	 as	 local	 elections	 become	
uncompetitive,	that	is,	as	ݒ௜ℓ,଴	goes	to	1	or	‐1	(the	proof	is	available	upon	request).	So,	this	particular	model	predicts	that	the	effect	of	alignment	at	close	elections	is	greater	than	the	effect	of	alignment	
averaged	across	all	elections.	
 
12	Technically,	as	̅ݒ௦,଴	decreases,	the	marginal	benefit	curves	of	both	aligned	and	unaligned	mayors	
become	 steeper,	making	 the	 use	 of	 transfers	more	 interesting	 for	 the	 incumbent.	 However,	 for	 a	
given	transfer	level,	the	difference	in	the	marginal	benefit	of	allocating	transfers	to	these	two	types	
of	 city	becomes	smaller,	making	discrimination	between	mayors	belonging	 to	 the	same	party	and	
opposition	mayors	less	appealing	too.	See	the	formal	proof	in	the	Appendix.			
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The	 fact	 that	 these	 predictions	 are	 conditional	 on	 local	 elections	 being	 close	 has	
implications	in	terms	of	identification.	This	is	actually	what	justifies	the	use	of	a	regression	
discontinuity	design	 for	estimating	 the	 size	of	 the	 jump	 in	 transfers	at	 the	 threshold	 (i.e.,	
when	ݒ௜ℓ,଴ ൌ 0).	The	advantage	of	the	RDD	is	that	it	provides	an	estimate	that	can	be	quite	
credibly	 interpreted	 as	 causal.	 Note,	 however,	 that	 the	 RDD	 only	 identifies	 the	 effect	 of	
alignment	at	close	elections	(i.e.,	the	local	average	treatment	effect	or	LATE).	However,	the	
model	 also	predicts	 differences	 in	 transfers	between	 aligned	 and	unaligned	 governments	
far	from	the	threshold.	This	means	that	according	to	the	model,	the	average	treatment	effect	
(ATE)	should	be	lower	than	the	LATE.	In	order	to	assess	whether	this	is	actually	the	case,	
we	also	provide	‘difference‐in‐differences’	estimates	for	the	ATE.	Of	course,	since	it	is	more	
difficult	 to	 interpret	 the	 DiD	 estimates	 as	 causal,	 we	 subject	 these	 results	 to	 additional	
reliability	 tests,	 and	 even	 then	 we	 are	 cautious	 in	 the	 interpretations	 we	 make.	 Note,	
however,	that	the	simplicity	of	the	DiD	specification	compared	to	the	complexity	of	the	RDD	
makes	these	results	potentially	useful	as	an	additional	check.	
3.		Institutional	context	
3.1	Local	government	finances			
The	 Spanish	 government	 comprises	 three	 layers:	 central,	 regional,	 and	 local.	 There	 are	
seventeen	 regional	 governments,	 the	 so‐called	 Autonomous	 Communities	 (ACs),	 which	
have	fairly	wide‐ranging	spending	responsibilities	 including,	 for	example,	 the	provision	of	
health	care,	education,	welfare	and	infrastructures.	Spain’s	local	layer	consists	of	over	eight	
thousand	 municipalities,	 most	 of	 which	 are	 relatively	 small.	 These	 municipalities	 are	
multipurpose	 governments,	 with	 major	 expenditure	 categories	 corresponding	 to	 the	
traditional	 responsibilities	 assigned	 to	 the	 local	 public	 sector	 (environmental	 services,	
urban	 planning,	 public	 transport,	 welfare,	 etc.).	 Current	 spending	 is	 financed	 out	 of	 the	
municipalities’	own	revenues	(two	thirds)	and	unconditional	grants	(one	third).	The	latter	
are	 allocated	 according	 to	 a	 formula,	 which	 hinders	 their	 use	 for	 pork‐barrel	 politics.	
However,	 the	 funding	 of	 capital	 spending	 is	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 grants,	which	 in	 2008	
represented	38%	of	 local	 investment.	 Capital	 spending	 represents	 21%	of	 total	 spending	
and,	thus,	capital	transfers	represent	8%	(=21%		0.38)	of	total	nonfinancial	revenues.	
Capital	 grants	 to	municipalities	 are	 transferred	primarily	 from	 the	 regional	 layer	 of	
government	(54%)13.	There	are	two	rationales	for	these	grants.	The	first	is	the	over‐lapping	
of	 responsibilities	 between	 regional	 and	 local	 governments	 –	 regions	 use	 transfers	 to	
advance	 their	 policy	 objectives	 while	 not	 having	 to	 worry	 about	 the	 problems	 of	
implementation.	 The	 second	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 assist	 needy	 local	 governments	 –	 small	
governments	 have	 difficulties	 in	 generating	 enough	 savings	 from	 the	 current	 account	 to	
                                                 
13	19%	comes	from	the	county	and	the	rest	from	the	central	government	(12%)	or	the	EU.	
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fund	 major	 investment	 projects,	 moreover	 financially	 distressed	 governments	 also	 have	
difficulties	in	accessing	credit.	These	transfers	take	the	form	of	‘project	grants’:	an	open	call	
is	made	at	 regular	 intervals	and	a	municipality	 can	apply	by	submitting	 its	 infrastructure	
projects	 (e.g.,	 street	 and	 road	 paving,	 sewage	 systems	 and	 water	 pipes,	 parks	 and	
recreations,	 education	 and	 sports	 facilities,	 etc.).	 These	 are	 evaluated	 according	 to	
previously	 established	 criteria	 (typically	 published	 in	 the	 call),	 which	 are	 subject	 to	 the	
interpretation	of	the	grantor.	Provisions	are	usually	made	for	funding	emergency	situations	
or	projects	considered	a	priority	concern	by	the	regional	government.	The	call	often	does	
not	specify	clearly	 the	weight	attached	to	each	of	 the	criteria	or	 it	 fails	 to	specify	the	 link	
between	 the	 score	 assigned	 to	 each	 criterion	 and	 an	 objective	 variable,	 leaving	 this	 very	
much	at	the	discretion	of	the	grantor	(see	Solé‐Ollé,	2012,	for	additional	discussion	on	this	
point).		
There	 is	 anecdotal	 evidence	 that	 the	 allocation	 of	 these	 regional	 transfers	 has	 been	
subject	 to	 political	manipulation	 in	 Spain.	 The	 following	 Internet	 posts	 are	 illustrative	 of	
partisanship	in	transfer	allocation	in	two	different	regions:	
“The	government	of	Valencia	allocates	all	 transfers	on	 the	basis	of	partisanship	
instead	of	adhering	to	objective	criteria,	never	in	accordance	with	the	needs	of	the	
municipalities	(…)	year	after	year	there	is	discrimination	against	citizens	living	in	
towns	not	governed	by	the	ruling	party.”	(www.vilaweb.cat,	07/05/2002)	
“The	other	problem	[with	transfers]	is	the	‘old‐boy	network’	and	the	‘partisanship’	
of	grantors.	 (…)	Having	a	 ‘friend	 in	 the	right	place’	and	being	a	 ‘member	of	 the	
party’	weigh	much	more	heavily	 than	 they	should	 in	 the	awarding	of	 transfers.”	
(http://blocs.mesvilaweb.cat/sbaulida,	02/13/2007)	
There	 is	 also	 some	 evidence	 that	 the	 different	 agents	 involved	 do	 care	 about	 who	
receives	the	credit	 for	the	facilities	built	with	these	transfers.	For	instance,	 in	2009,	when	
the	Spanish	socialist	government,	as	part	of	a	stimulus	package,	decided	to	allocate	capital	
transfers	 to	municipalities	on	a	per	capita	basis,	many	socialists	 in	opposition	at	 the	 local	
layer	 complained	 about	 how	 this	 would	 harm	 their	 electoral	 prospects	 at	 the	 next	
municipal	elections.	Similarly,	central	government	sought	 to	obtain	 the	political	credit	 for	
these	stimulus	transfers	by	ordering	the	installation	of	huge	billboards	on	the	public	work	
sites	stating	clearly	that	central	government	was	responsible	for	the	program.	There	is	even	
some	anecdotal	evidence	that	some	opposition	mayors	removed	these	billboards	to	avoid	
any	 loss	 of	 credit14.	 All	 this	 evidence	 supports	 the	 credit‐claiming	 mechanism,	 which	
                                                 
14“Coloca	 vallas	 que	 algo	 queda”	 (Put	 up	 billboards:	 there’s	 credit	 still	 to	 be	won),	 Las	 Províncias	
18/06/2009.	 The	 newspaper	 reported	 that	 “The	 conflict	 over	 investments	 has	 led	 the	 central	
government	 and	 the	 local	 council	 of	 Castellón	 to	 erect	 two	 different	 billboards,	 both	 claiming	
responsibility	for	the	same	action”.			
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explains	 why	 the	 regional	 incumbent	 is	 interested	 in	 discriminating	 in	 favor	 of	 aligned	
mayors.	
3.2	Regional	and	local	politics	in	Spain	
Regional	 politics.	 Elections	 to	 the	 regional	 parliament	 are	 held	 every	 four	 years.	 Voters	
choose	between	several	party	 lists,	 and	 the	electoral	 system	is	based	on	 the	d’Hondt	rule	
with	a	threshold.	Representatives	elect	the	regional	president	by	simple	majority	and	she,	
in	 turn,	 decides	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 Cabinet.	 Around	 a	 third	 of	 the	 incumbents	 sit	 in	
minority	 or	 coalition	 governments.	 Coalitions	 tend	 to	 be	 formed	 along	 ideological	 lines,	
albeit	with	 a	 few	 exceptions.	 There	 are	 three	national	 parties	 that	 run	 in	 all	 regions:	 the	
PSOE	(the	main	party	on	the	left),	the	PP	(the	only	national	party	on	the	right)	and	IU	(the	
former	 communists).	 There	 are	 also	many	 regionally	 based	parties,	 some	on	 the	 left	 and	
some	on	the	right.	Some	of	these	parties	never	cross	ideological	bloc	lines,	while	others	are	
able	 to	 reach	 agreements	 with	 both	 left‐	 and	 right‐wing	 parties.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	 vast	
majority	of	regional	presidents	belong	to	the	PSOE	and	the	PP	(36	and	51%,	respectively,	in	
our	sample).	Regionalist	parties	held	the	regional	presidency	in	the	rest	of	the	cases	(13%).	
We	take	these	characteristics	into	account	in	our	analysis.	
Regional	elections	are	held	on	the	same	day	as	are	local	elections	in	thirteen	out	of	the	
seventeen	regions.	In	the	remaining	regions	(i.e.,	Galicia,	Catalonia,	the	Basque	Country,	and	
Andalusia),	 elections	 are	 held	 between	 at	 the	 midpoint	 between	 two	 consecutive	 local	
elections.	 It	 is	 unclear	 how	 the	 existence	 of	 these	 two	 systems	 of	 timing	 affects	 the	
plausibility	of	our	main	hypothesis.	Since	we	are	not	interested	in	the	effect	of	each	type	of	
electoral	 timing	per	 se,	what	we	do	 in	 the	 robustness	 tests	of	 the	empirical	 analysis	 is	 to	
show	that	the	results	do	not	depend	on	the	specific	configuration	of	the	timing	of	elections.	
Important	 to	 our	 study	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 regional	 elections	 are	 not	 very	
competitive.	As	we	show	in	detail	below,	differences	in	vote/seat	shares	between	the	ruling	
party/coalition	 and	 the	 opposition	 and/or	 between	 the	 first	 and	 second	 party	 might	 be	
great,	 and	 the	political	 turnover	very	 low.	Consider,	 for	example,	 the	 case	of	Andalusia,	 a	
traditional	 stronghold	 of	 the	 PSOE,	 where	 accusations	 of	 favoritism	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	
public	spending	are	common	(see	e.g.,	Curto‐Grau,	2017).	In	this	region,	the	seat	advantage	
of	 the	PSOE	(the	main	Spanish	 left‐wing	party)	over	 the	PP	 (the	main	Spanish	right‐wing	
party)	 reached	 22%	 in	 the	 2000s,	 and	 the	 PSOE	 has	won	 all	 regional	 elections	 since	 the	
arrival	of	democracy.	Take	also	the	case	of	the	Canary	Islands,	where	the	coalition	between	
a	 regionalist	 party	 (CC,	 Coalición	Canaria)	 and	 the	 PP	 reached	 a	 seat	 advantage	 over	 the	
PSOE	 of	 38%.	 Of	 course,	 there	 are	 also	 many	 cases	 of	 highly	 competitive	 elections	 (see	
Table	A.7	in	the	Appendix).	
13
Local	politics.	Local	elections	are	held	every	four	years	on	the	same	day	throughout	all	the	
Spanish	 municipalities.	 Voters	 choose	 between	 several	 closed	 party	 lists.	 The	 electoral	
system	is	a	proportional	one,	votes	being	allocated	to	seats	using	 the	d’Hondt	rule	with	a	
threshold	(see	section	4.4	for	a	more	detailed	explanation	of	how	this	works).	The	mayor	is	
subsequently	elected	by	a	simple	majority	in	the	council	(see	Colomer,	1995).	The	council	
operates	as	a	small	representative	democracy,	and	has	to	reach	a	majority	vote	to	pass	the	
initiatives	and	regulations	proposed	by	the	mayor,	who	acts	as	the	agenda‐setter.	Mouritzen	
and	Svara	(2002)	classify	Spanish	mayors	as	‘strong	mayors’,	meaning	“the	elected	mayor	is	
in	control	of	 the	majority	of	 the	city	council	and	 in	 full	 charge	of	all	 executive	 functions”.	
Moreover,	 the	 discipline	 enforced	 by	 Spain’s	 political	 parties	 means	 that	 the	 chances	 of	
amending	 the	mayor’s	 proposals	 are	 low	when	 the	mayor’s	 party	 or	 coalition	 controls	 a	
majority	 of	 the	 seats.	 The	 fairly	 large	proportion	of	minority	 or	 coalition	 governments	 is	
undeniable	 (around	 one	 third	 during	 the	 terms	 analyzed	 here),	 although	 most	 of	 these	
coalitions	are	formed	along	ideological	lines.	There	are,	of	course,	some	exceptions	to	this	
rule.	For	 instance,	when	a	regionalist	party	crosses	 the	 ideological	border	and	supports	a	
regional	 president	of	 a	 different	 ideology	 this	 generates	 some	pressure	on	 their	 local	 co‐
partisans	 to	 do	 the	 same	 and	 to	 support	 the	 candidate	 for	 mayor	 belonging	 to	 the	
president’s	 party.	 In	 the	 empirical	 analysis,	 we	 proceed	 by	 assuming	 that	 coalitions	 are	
formed	along	ideological	lines,	but	we	classify	the	regionalist	parties	in	the	ideological	bloc	
of	 the	 regional	 president	 if	 they	 support	 her	 in	 the	 regional	 Parliament.	 Moreover,	 the	
platforms	of	the	few	local	parties	tend	to	be	based	solely	on	local	issues	so	they	are	under	
less	 pressure	 to	 reach	 an	 agreement	on	 ideological	 grounds	 or	because	of	 pressure	 from	
higher	party	ranks.	We	show	that	 the	results	are	robust	 to	different	ways	of	dealing	with	
these	parties.	Note	in	any	case	that	these	two	problems	are	of	no	quantitative	relevance.	As	
in	the	case	of	regional	governments,	most	mayors	belong	to	the	PSOE	or	the	PP	(48.5	and	
37.5%,	respectively,	in	our	sample).	Regionalist	parties	only	held	10.6%	of	mayoralties	and	
this	 figure	 is	 much	 lower	 for	 regionalist	 parties	 crossing	 ideological	 lines	 (1.6%).	 The	
percentage	of	local	parties	holding	the	mayoralty	is	also	low	(3.4%).		
4.	Empirical	design	
4.1.	RDD	and	PR	systems	
Studies	adopting	observational	approaches	to	estimate	the	effect	of	party	ideology	on	votes	
and	policy	outcomes	may	suffer	 from	an	omitted	variables	problem:	party	control	 can	be	
correlated	with	an	incumbent’s	popularity	and	this,	 in	turn,	might	 impact	on	the	outcome	
variable.	 To	 deal	 with	 this	 problem	 some	 papers	 have	 recently	 adopted	 the	 ‘close‐race’	
regression	 discontinuity	 design	 (RDD)	 framework	 (see	 Lee,	 2008;	 Lee	 et	 al.,	 2004;	
Pettersson‐Lidbom,	 2008;	 Ferreira	 and	 Gyourko,	 2009;	 Folke,	 2014,	 and	 Gerber	 and	
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Hopkins,	2011).	The	reasoning	underpinning	this	method	is	that	elections	won	by	a	narrow	
margin	are,	in	practice,	very	similar	events	to	elections	lost	by	a	similarly	narrow	margin.		
The	 fact	 that	 local	 councils	 are	 elected	 in	 Spain	 using	 party‐list	 proportional	
representation	(PR)	precludes	the	use	of	a	traditional	RDD.	In	PR	systems	voters	can	vote	
for	one	of	many	party	lists	and	these	votes	are	transformed	into	seats	in	the	local	council	
using	a	specific	conversion	method	(i.e.,	the	Sainte‐Lägue	method	in	Sweden	or	Norway	or	
the	 d’Hondt	method	 in	 Spain).	 Representatives	 on	 the	 city	 council	 then	 elect	 the	mayor,	
who	 in	 turn	 elects	 the	members	 of	 the	 executive.	 The	 first	 challenge	 posed	 by	 such	 an	
institutional	 setting	 is	 that	 sometimes	 no	 single	 party	 holds	 a	 majority	 of	 seats	 in	 the	
council,	 which	means	 that	 the	mayor	 has	 to	 be	 supported	 by	 a	 coalition	 of	 parties.	 The	
second	 challenge	 concerns	 the	 difficulties	 in	 identifying	 the	 vote	 threshold	 at	 which	 an	
additional	 vote	 switches	 a	 seat	 from	 one	 party	 to	 another	 (and,	 thus,	 from	 the	 coalition	
supporting	the	mayor	to	the	opposition).	Here,	we	follow	the	solution	proposed	by	recent	
studies	that	have	adapted	the	RD	methodology	to	a	PR	system	(see	Folke,	2014;	Ade	and	
Freier,	2013;	Fiva	et	al.,	2015;	and	Fiva	and	Halse,	2016).		
First,	although	in	around	a	third	of	Spanish	local	governments	the	mayor’s	party	does	
not	 hold	 a	 majority	 of	 seats	 on	 the	 council,	 ideology	 is	 a	 very	 powerful	 driver	 of	 the	
formation	of	 the	coalition	of	parties	 that	support	 the	mayor.	This	allows	us	 to	define	our	
treatment	as	a	situation	in	which	the	ideological	bloc	of	the	party	of	the	regional	president	
has	a	majority	of	seats	on	the	 local	council.	So,	when	parties	on	the	 left	of	the	ideological	
spectrum	have	a	majority	of	seats,	it	is	highly	likely	that	the	mayor	will	also	to	the	left‐wing	
party	bloc;	if	the	regional	president	belongs	to	a	left‐wing	(right‐wing)	party	then	we	can	
say	that	the	mayor	and	the	president	are	aligned	(unaligned).	The	same	applies	when	right‐
wing	 parties	 hold	 a	 majority	 of	 seats.	 This	 is	 exactly	 the	 procedure	 used	 in	 Fiva	 et	 al.	
(2015),	and	Fiva	and	Halse	 (2016).	However,	 the	 fact	 that	a	 small	proportion	of	 regional	
and	 local	 parties	 are	 able	 to	 support	 both	 right‐	 and	 left‐wing	 parties	 means	 that	 the	
ideological	factor	will	not	always	work.	In	the	case	of	regional	parties,	we	classify	them	as	
belonging	to	the	ideological	bloc	of	the	president,	if	they	support	that	party	in	the	regional	
parliament.	 The	 evidence	 that	 regional	 coalitions	 tend	 to	 reproduce	 at	 the	 local	 level	
justifies	 this	procedure.	 In	any	case,	we	use	a	 ‘fuzzy’	RDD	as	 in	Fiva	and	Halse	 (2016)	 to	
take	into	account	the	fact	that	ideology	does	not	predict	with	any	certainty	the	alignment	
status	(see	also	Van	der	Klauw,	2002,	and	Lee	and	Lemieux,	2010).		
Second,	 even	 if	 the	 treatment	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 discontinuity	 of	 seats	 is	 relatively	
straightforward	to	define,	elections	won	or	lost	by	a	difference	of	one	seat	are	probably	not	
that	 close	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 number	 of	 votes.	 In	 small	municipalities,	 in	 particular,	 a	 high	
percentage	 of	 votes	 is	 needed	 to	 win	 one	 more	 seat.	 Thus,	 using	 the	 number	 or	 the	
percentage	of	seats	as	our	forcing	variable	might	not	be	appropriate	(see	Fiva	et	al.,	2015,	
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for	 a	 discussion	 of	 this	 point).	 Instead,	 we	 use	 a	 forcing	 variable	 computed	 as	 the	
percentage	of	votes	 that	 the	 ideological	bloc	of	 the	 regional	president	must	 lose	 (win)	 in	
order	to	lose	(win)	the	majority	of	seats	in	the	council.	We	first	have	to	identify	the	last	seat	
that	was	won	by	the	majority	bloc.	Then,	we	have	to	compute	how	many	votes	the	parties	
in	that	bloc	would	have	to	lose	for	that	seat	to	be	transferred	to	a	party	in	the	opposition	
bloc.	This	computation	 is	 far	 from	straightforward	because	whether	a	seat	 is	allocated	to	
one	party	or	to	another	depends	on	the	vote	shares	of	all	the	votes	cast	at	the	same	time	
(see	Fiva,	2014,	and	Fiva	et	al.,	2015).	The	way	the	literature	has	overcome	this	problem	is	
by	 subjecting	 the	 whole	 distribution	 of	 votes	 among	 parties	 to	 a	 series	 of	 small	
perturbations,	 simulating	 the	 effects	 on	 the	 distribution	 of	 seats,	 and	 defining	
uncompetitive	 elections	 as	 those	 in	 which	 the	 seat	 majority	 rarely	 changes	 (see	 Folke,	
2014).	In	this	paper,	we	use	a	procedure	with	similar	properties,	but	one	that	is	based	on	
the	exact	calculation	of	 the	number	of	votes	 that	have	 to	be	subtracted	 from	the	mayor’s	
ideological	bloc	for	that	bloc	to	lose	its	majority	in	the	council.	Our	calculations	are	based	
on	certain	assumptions	that	we	consider	reasonable	in	the	Spanish	case.	We	show	that	the	
results	 are	 robust	 to	 modifications	 in	 these	 assumptions.	We	 explain	 in	 detail	 how	 this	
procedure	works	in	the	following	section	and	in	the	Appendix	(see	Tables	A.3	and	A.4).	
4.2.	Equation	specification		
The	 first	 step	 in	 our	 RDD	 analysis	 involves	 testing	 for	 a	 discontinuity	 of	 transfers	 at	 the	
threshold.	To	do	so,	we	use	the	following	two‐equation	model:	
																																																				߬௜௧ ൌ ߙܽ௜௧ ൅ ݃ሺݒ௜௧଴ ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧																																																								(7)	
																																																				ܽ௜௧ ൌ ߛ݀௜௧ ൅ ݄ሺݒ௜௧଴ ሻ ൅ ߳௜௧																																																								(8)	
where	߬௜௧	are	the	per	capita	capital	transfers	received	by	the	local	government	before	local	
elections	and		ܽ௜௧ ൌ 1	if	there	is	alignment	between	the	regional	and	the	local	government	
and	0	otherwise.	The	variable	ݒ௜௧଴ 	is	the	percentage	of	votes	in	the	previous	local	elections	
that	the	parties	in	the	regional	president’s	ideological	bloc	would	have	to	lose	(if	they	hold	
the	mayoralty)	or	win	(if	they	are	in	opposition	at	the	local	level)	to	lose	(win)	a	majority	of	
seats	 in	 the	 local	 council	 and	 so	 lose	 (win)	 control	 of	 the	 government.	 This	 variable	 is	
computed	using	a	specific	algebraic	method	developed	herein.	Henceforth,	we	refer	to	this	
variable	as	the	Regional	 incumbent’s	bloc	vote	margin.	With	 	݀௜௧ ൌ 1	we	denote	a	situation	
where	this	vote	margin	is	positive	(i.e.,	݀௜௧ ൌ 1	if	ݒ௜௧଴ ൐ 0,	and	0	otherwise).	The	terms	݃ሺݒ௜௧଴ ሻ	
and	݄ሺݒ௜௧଴ ሻ	are	polynomials	in	ݒ௜௧଴ ,	fitted	separately	at	either	side	of	the	threshold	(see	Lee	et	
al.,	2004;	Lee,	2008;	and	Lee	and	Lemieux,	2010).	Equation	(7)	is	used	to	estimate	the	effect	
of	alignment	on	transfers.	Equation	(8)	is	the	first	stage	and	estimates	the	discontinuity	in	
alignment	that	we	use	for	identification.		
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We	estimate	(7)	by	2SLS,	using	݀௜௧	as	an	 instrument	 for	ܽ௜௧.	The	estimates	obtained	
can	be	interpreted	as	a	weighted	LATE,	where	the	weights	reflect	the	ex‐ante	likelihood	of	
being	near	the	threshold	(see	Lee	and	Lemieux,	2010).	To	obtain	valid	estimates	of	equation	
(7),	all	 factors	–	besides	alignment	–	 that	could	potentially	 influence	the	 level	of	 transfers	
have	 to	 be	 continuous	 at	 the	 threshold.	 In	 the	next	 section,	we	discuss	 these	 factors	 and	
provide	evidence	for	their	continuity	at	the	threshold.	
The	specification	in	(7)	can	easily	be	modified	to	analyze	the	heterogeneous	effects	of	
interest.	 In	particular,	 following	Becker	et	al.	 (2013),	we	estimate	a	HLATE	by	 interacting	
the	 treatment	 with	 a	 demeaned	 variable	 ݖ௥௧ ൌ ሺݒ௥௧ െ ̅ݒሻ,	 where	 ݒ௥௧	 and	 ̅ݒ	 measure	 the	
degree	of	electoral	competition	 in	region	r	at	 t	 and	on	average,	 respectively.	We	estimate	
the	following	equation	to	obtain	the	HLATE:	
																																							߬௜௧ ൌ ߟଵܽ௜௧ ൅ ߟଶܽ௜௧ݖ௥௧ ൅ ݈ሺݒ௜௧଴ , ݖ௥௧ሻ ൅ ߫௜௧																																									(9)		
where	the	term	݈ሺݒ௜௧଴ , ݖ௥௧ሻ	is	an	interaction	between	the	polynomials	in		ݒ௜௧଴ 	and	ݖ௥௧15.	Again,	
the	coefficients	1	and	2	are	estimated	using	2SLS.	The	coefficient	1	provides	the	estimate	
of	the	party	favoritism	effect	when	the	level	of	electoral	competition	at	the	regional	level	is	
equal	to	the	sample	mean.	The	partisan	alignment	effect,	conditional	on	the	level	of	regional	
electoral	 competition,	 is	 computed	 as		ߟଵ ൅ ߟଶݖ௥௧.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 we	 explain	 the	
additional	assumptions	needed	to	identify	these	effects.	
As	 explained	 above,	 we	 also	 report	 the	 DiD	 results,	 given	 that	 they	 may	 provide	
information	about	average	treatment	effects	and	can,	in	any	case,	be	used	as	a	background	
check.	The	DiD	equations	can	be	expressed	as	follows:	
																																																			߬௜௧ ൌ ߚܽ௜௧ ൅ ௜݂ ൅ ௥݂௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧																																																		(10a)	
																																								߬௜௧ ൌ ߷ଵܽ௜௧ ൅ ߷ଶܽ௜௧ݖ௦௧ ൅ ௜݂ ൅ ௥݂௧ ൅ ߱௜௧																																						(10b)		
where	 ௜݂	and		 ௥݂௧	are	municipality	and	region	ൈ	period	fixed	effects.	In	the	next	section	we	
also	discuss	how	to	interpret	the	DiD	results.	
4.3.	Econometrics		
RDD	 assumptions.	 The	 validity	 of	 the	 RDD	 rests	 on	 certain	 assumptions	 that	 have	 to	 be	
tested.	 First,	 we	 document	 that	 there	 is	 a	 genuine	 discontinuity	 in	 the	 probability	 of	
                                                 
15	The	specification	could	have	been	either	more	flexible	or	simpler.	On	the	one	hand,	a	more	flexible	
specification	would	have	included	higher	order	terms	on	the	interacted	variable.	We	have	checked	
this	 possibility.	 It	 turns	 out,	 however,	 that	 higher	 order	 polynomials	 in	 ݖ௦௧	 do	 not	 improve	 the	model’s	goodness	of	 fit.	On	 the	other	hand,	we	could	have	 introduced	ݖ௦௧	 (or	a	polynomial	 in	ݖ௦௧)	
additively	(i.e.,	without	interacting	its	terms	with	those	of	the	polynomial	in	ݒ௜௧଴ );	the	fit	of	the	model	
improves	 substantially	when	we	 allow	 the	 polynomial	 in	 ݒ௜௧଴ 	 to	 vary	with	 regional‐level	 electoral	competition.	See	Becker	et	al.	(2013)	for	discussion.	
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treatment.	We	show	graphically	that	this	is	the	case.	In	our	case,	the	jump	in	the	probability	
of	 treatment	 is	 lower	 than	 one,	 and	 this	 justifies	 the	 use	 of	 a	 ‘fuzzy’	 design.	 	 Second,	we	
show	that	 the	 forcing	variable	used	 is	 continuous	around	 the	 threshold	by	 inspecting	 the	
histogram	 and	 using	 the	 formal	 test	 proposed	 by	 McCrary	 (2008).	 The	 continuity	 test	
provides	 a	means	 for	 discarding	 the	manipulation	 of	 the	 forcing	 variable.	 For	 this	 same	
purpose,	 we	 also	 test	 for	 the	 continuity	 of	 pre‐determined	 covariates.	 These	 tests	 also	
provide	reassurance	that	the	computation	of	our	forcing	variable	is	meaningful.	As	we	are	
able	to	show,	treated	and	control	samples	are	balanced	once	we	control	for	the	number	of	
votes	needed	for	that	last	seat	to	switch	party	blocs,	and	independently	of	the	assumptions	
used	to	compute	this	variable.	
Third,	 in	 order	 for	 the	 RDD	 estimates	 of	 the	 heterogeneous	 effects	 to	 be	 valid,	 two	
additional	 assumptions	 need	 to	 be	 fulfilled	 (see	Becker	 et	al.,	 2013).	 The	 first	 is	 that	 the	
source	of	heterogeneity	(ݖ௦௧)	also	has	to	be	continuous	at	the	threshold16.	This	assumption	
is	 important	 for	 the	 HLATE	 to	 pick	 up	 genuine	 variation	 in	 the	 interacted	 variable.	 	We	
check	 this	 assumption	 by	 plotting	 a	 graph	 for	 our	 measure	 of	 regional‐level	 electoral	
competition	to	determine	whether	this	variable	is	discontinuous	about	the	forcing	variable	
at	the	threshold	or	not.	The	second	assumption	is	that,	conditional	on	the	forcing	variable,	
the	assignment	of	the	interaction	variable	has	to	be	random,	which	means	that	conditional	
on	the	polynomial	of	the	vote	margin	at	 the	 local	elections,	municipalities	 in	regions	with	
high	 and	 low	 regional	 electoral	 competition	 should	 not	 differ	 in	 unobserved	 factors	 that	
may	influence	the	allocation	of	transfers.	To	ensure	that	our	results	are	not	driven	by	the	
omission	 of	 confounding	 factors	 of	 this	 type,	 we	 add	 to	 our	 RDD	 specification	 a	 set	 of	
regionൈ	period	fixed	effects	and	interactions	between	alignment	and	variables	that	might,	at	
the	 same	 time,	 reasonably	 be	 thought	 to	 influence	 the	 allocation	 of	 transfers	 across	
municipalities	and	which	are	correlated	with	electoral	competition	at	the	regional	level.	For	
example,	we	 include	 interactions	of	 alignment	with	 the	 financial	 situation	at	 the	 regional	
level	(i.e.,	tax	revenues,	debt	level,	spending	needs	and	responsibilities),	and	with	variables	
that	 measure	 other	 possible	 regional‐wide	 political	 influences	 over	 the	 allocation	 of	
transfers.	We	 also	 show	 that	 these	 additional	 interaction	 variables	 are	 continuous	 at	 the	
threshold.	
For	the	DiD	results	to	be	valid,	aligned	and	unaligned	municipalities	need	to	adhrere	to	
parallel	trends	before	the	treatment.	Given	the	low	number	of	cross‐sections	available	to	us,	
to	 check	 for	 this	 we	 run	 a	 placebo	 test,	 introducing	 a	 lead	 of	 alignment	 in	 the	 equation	
(which	means	 that	we	 lose	 the	 last	 cross‐section).	 For	 our	DiD	 estimates	 to	 be	 valid,	we	
should	find	that	alignment	in	the	future	does	not	affect	partisan	favoritism	in	the	present,	
                                                 
16 The	 continuity	 of	 the	 interacted	 variable	 is	 the	 assumption	 ensuring	 the	 LATE	 is	 estimated	
consistently,	provided	that	the	variable	is	demeaned	(see	Cattaneo	et	al.	(2016).		
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and	also	that	the	effect	of	contemporaneous	alignment	remains	once	we	control	for	future	
alignment.	We	also	run	a	regression	with	a	lag	of	alignment	(which	means	that	we	lose	the	
first	cross‐section).	The	idea	is	that	for	the	whole	story	to	make	sense	the	contemporaneous	
effect	 of	 alignment	 should	 also	 remain	 statistically	 significant	 once	 we	 introduce	 a	 lag.	
Finding	otherwise	would	mean	that	alignment	only	has	an	effect	after	 the	election,	which	
does	not	make	much	sense	if	incumbents	use	transfers	with	the	aim	of	buying	votes.		
Estimation	 and	 inference.	 First,	 our	 main	 RDD	 estimation	 method	 uses	 all	 the	
observations	while	controlling	for	a	flexible	polynomial	in	ݒ௜௧.଴.	Following	Lee	and	Lemieux	
(2010),	 we	 explicitly	 test	 for	 the	 optimal	 order	 of	 the	 polynomial	 with	 the	 Akaike	
information	criteria.	This	procedure	allows	us	to	retain	the	entire	sample	when	estimating	
the	heterogeneous	effects.	A	possible	drawback	of	this	method	is	that	our	results	might	be	
sensitive	to	outcome	values	for	observations	far	away	from	the	threshold	(see	Imbens	and	
Lemieux,	 2008).	 As	 we	 show,	 we	 need	 not	 be	 greatly	 concerned	 by	 this,	 since	 the	
coefficients	are	 fairly	 stable	 in	our	 case	and	 the	optimal	polynomial	 ends	up	being	of	 the	
order	 of	 two.	 In	 any	 case,	 we	 also	 estimate	 the	 discontinuity	 by	means	 of	 a	 local	 linear	
regression,	using	the	optimal	bandwidth	(computed	as	per	Calonico	et	al.,	2014).	Second,	in	
the	estimation	of	the	HLATE	we	use	the	optimal	polynomial	in	ݒ௜௧.଴	for	the	whole	sample	and	
try	different	specifications	for	ݖ௦௧.	Third,	standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	municipality	
level	 whenever	 the	 LATE	 are	 computed	 and	 at	 the	 regional	 level	 when	we	 estimate	 the	
HLATE17.	 To	 account	 for	 the	 fact	 that	we	 have	 a	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 clusters,	 we	
apply	 finite	 sample	 corrections	 to	 standard	 errors	 and	 tests	 (see	 Angrist	 and	 Pischke,	
2009)18.		
4.4	Sample	and	data.	
Sample.	 We	 estimate	 the	 effects	 of	 partisan	 alignment	 between	 local	 and	 regional	
governments	 on	 transfers	 from	 the	 regional	 to	 the	 local	 level	 using	 data	 for	 Spanish	
municipalities	 and	 regions	 (i.e.,	 Autonomous	 Communities,	 ACs).	 We	 use	 three	 cross‐
sections	 of	 data,	 for	 the	 terms	 1996‐1999,	 2000‐03	 and	 2004‐07,	 with	 around	 2,000	
municipalities	in	each.	The	outcomes	of	the	1995	election	affect	transfers	in	1996‐1999;	the	
                                                 
17	When	estimating	the	LATE,	we	cluster	standard	errors	at	the	municipality	level	because	political	
preferences	are	quite	persistent	over	time	within	municipalities.	However,	it	might	also	be	thought	
that	 capital	 transfers	 are	 set	 at	 the	 regional	 level	 and	 so	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 there	 is	 some	 sort	 of	
correlation	between	the	amounts	received	by	a	region’s	municipalities.	However,	clustering	at	the	
regional	 level	 does	 not	 increase	 the	 standard	 errors	 at	 all	 in	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 LATE.	When	
estimating	the	HLATE,	clustering	at	the	regional	 level	 is	required	because	the	interacted	variables	
are	measured	 at	 this	 level.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 standard	 errors	 of	 the	 interacted	 terms	 do	 increase	
substantially	when	we	cluster	at	the	regional	level.	
18We	 also	 computed	wild‐bootstrap	 standard	 errors	 (Cameron	 and	Miller,	 2015).	 The	 results	 are	
not	shown	here	but	the	p‐values	were	just	slightly	lower	than	the	ones	we	report.	
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1999	election	 influences	 the	2000‐03	period;	and	 the	2003	election	has	an	 impact	on	 the	
transfers	allocated	during	2004‐07.	The	 sample	 is	determined	by	data	on	 transfers	 taken	
from	a	survey	on	budget	outlays	conducted	yearly	by	 the	Spanish	Ministry	of	Economics.	
This	 database	 includes	 all	 municipalities	 with	 more	 than	 5,000	 residents	 and	 a	
representative	sample	of	the	rest19.		
Transfers.	 The	 results	 reported	 show	 the	 estimates	 of	 alignment	 effects	 on	 capital	
transfers	 from	 regional	 to	 local	 governments	 in	 the	 two	 years	 preceding	 the	 next	 local	
election.	 As	 explained	 in	 section	 three,	 given	 the	 characteristics	 of	 these	 transfers,	 we	
expect	 them	to	matter	more	 in	 the	period	running	up	to	 local	elections.	Further,	 the	 two‐
year	 aggregation	 helps	 to	 reduce	 the	 volatility	 of	 the	 variable	 and	 the	 use	 of	 yearly	
information	does	not	provide	any	statistical	advantage,	since	the	alignment	status	does	not	
change	 between	 years	 within	 these	 two‐year	 periods.	 As	 explained	 above,	 we	 focus	 on	
capital	grants	originating	 from	the	regional	government	because	of	 the	greater	discretion	
applied	in	their	allocation.		
Alignment.	 The	 alignment	 concept	 used	 throughout	 this	 study	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 a	
dummy	equal	to	one	when	the	mayor	and	the	regional	president	belong	to	the	same	party	
(Mayor‐President	alignment).	We	consider	that	it	is	in	such	cases	that	the	incentive	to	avoid	
losing	 credit	 for	 the	 transfers	 allocated	 is	 strongest.	 In	 robustness	 checks,	 we	 have	 also	
sought	 to	 verify	 whether	 the	 results	 are	 affected	 by	 the	 use	 of	 more	 comprehensive	
alignment	definitions:	 that	 is,	 situations	 in	which	the	mayor	and/or	 the	main	partner	of	a	
coalition	belong	to	the	same	party	(Partner	alignment),	and	situations	in	which	the	mayor	
and	the	regional	president	belong	to	the	same	ideological	bloc	(Bloc	alignment)20.	See	Table	
A.1	in	the	Appendix	for	the	sources	of	these	variables.		
Forcing	 variable.	 The	 forcing	 variable	 is	 the	 Regional	 incumbent’s	 bloc	 vote	margin,	
computed	 as	 the	 votes	 needed	 for	 the	 ideological	 bloc	 of	 the	 regional	 incumbent	 to	win	
(lose)	the	majority	of	seats	on	the	local	council,	expressed	as	a	percentage	of	total	votes	cast	
at	the	local	elections.	To	define	the	ideological	blocs,	we	classify	all	parties	standing	at	local	
elections	in	three	groups:	left,	right	and	local	parties.	Most	parties	are	classified	as	either	left	
or	right,	based	on	party	statements	and	knowledge	of	 their	recent	experience	of	coalition	
                                                 
19	 Due	 to	 data	 accessibility	 problems,	 the	 analysis	 is	 restricted	 to	 fifteen	 regions,	 excluding	 the	
Basque	Country	and	Navarra.	These	are	 small	 regions	 and	 their	 exclusion	 should	not	 represent	 a	
problem.	 Moreover,	 data	 availability	 also	 restricts	 the	 sample	 to	 municipalities	 with	 more	 than	
1,000	residents.	
20	Note	that	when	examining	the	effect	of	Mayor‐President	alignment,	municipalities	with	other	types	
of	 alignment	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 sample.	 Thus,	 the	 control	 group	 is	 basically	 formed	 by	 local	
governments	 ruled	by	 a	 party	 from	 the	 regional	 opposition	 (either	 in	majority	 or	 in	 coalition).	 A	
similar	logic	applies	when	examining	other	types	of	alignment.	We	consider	these	definitions	of	the	
treatment	 and	 controls	 as	 being	 the	 ones	 that	 make	 most	 sense	 in	 terms	 of	 credit	 claiming	
incentives.	
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formation.	 There	 are	 a	 few	 small	 regional	 parties	 for	 which	 classification	 is	 difficult,	
particularly	 as	 their	 decisions	 sometimes	 run	 counter	 to	 formal	 statements	 of	 their	
ideology21.	What	we	have	opted	to	do	is	to	classify	these	parties	as	left‐wing	(right‐wing)	if	
they	 currently	 supporting	 a	 left‐wing	 (right‐wing)	 regional	 president	 at	 the	moment	 and	
according	 to	 their	 ideology	 if	 not.	 Local	 parties	 are	 also	 difficult	 to	 classify.	 Some	 are	
classified	as	right‐	or	 left‐wing	parties	on	 the	basis	of	 their	party	name.	This	 is	especially	
true	 in	 the	 case	 of	 left‐wing	 parties,	 whose	 names	 often	 contain	 explicit	 labels	 (e.g.,	
‘communist’	or	‘green’)	of	their	ideology.	The	local	parties	whose	ideology	cannot	be	clearly	
identified	are	 initially	classified	as	right‐wing,	although	we	also	test	 the	robustness	of	 the	
results	when	 they	are	 treated	as	 left‐wing	parties.	As	 an	additional	 robustness	 check,	we	
also	 provide	 results	 after	 excluding	 from	 the	 analysis	 those	 municipalities	 with	 some	
representation	 in	 the	 local	 council	 of	 regional	 parties	 or	 local	parties	 that	 are	 difficult	 to	
classify.	 The	 results	 obtained	 do	 not	 depend	 on	 the	 inclusion	 or	 exclusion	 of	 these	 very	
small	parties	from	the	analysis22.		
Instead	of	relying	on	simulations	as	in	Folke	(2014),	Fiva	et	al.	(2015),	and	Fiva	and	
Halse	 (2016),	we	develop	an	exact	algebraic	 formulation	of	 the	 forcing	variable	based	on	
the	workings	of	the	d’Hondt	method,	which	is	used	to	translate	votes	into	seats	in	Spanish	
local	 elections.	 For	 readers	 unfamiliar	with	 it,	 the	 d’Hondt	method	works	 as	 follows.	 For	
each	 party	 obtaining	 more	 than	 5%	 of	 the	 vote,	 a	 series	 of	 ‘comparison	 numbers’	 are	
computed	by	successively	dividing	its	votes	by	1,	2,	3,	4,	etc.	The	‘comparison	numbers’	of	
all	parties	are	then	ranked	and	a	given	number	of	seats	are	allocated	to	the	parties	on	the	
basis	of	this	ranking	(see	Table	A.4	in	the	Appendix	for	an	illustration	of	the	workings	of	the	
d’Hondt	rule).	So,	for	each	party’s	marginal	seat,	there	is	an	additional	number	of	votes	that	
are	needed	 in	order	to	win	an	extra	seat	(or	which	must	not	be	 lost	 in	order	to	hold	that	
seat).		
Our	forcing	variable	is	computed	as	the	number	of	votes	at	the	local	elections	that	the	
ideological	bloc	of	the	regional	president	has	to	lose	(gain)	in	order	to	lose	(win)	a	majority	
of	 seats.	 We	 make	 this	 calculation	 under	 different	 vote	 migration	 scenarios.	 In	 our	
preferred	measure	(used	to	present	our	main	results),	we	assume	that	the	votes	taken	away	
from	the	party	holding	the	marginal	seat	are	transferred	only	to	abstention	and	not	to	the	
parties	 in	 the	 other	 ideological	 bloc23.	 We	 also	 assume	 that	 negative	 vote	 shocks	
                                                 
21	Some	regionalist	parties	have	historically	entered	coalition	governments	with	either	left‐	or	right‐
wing	incumbents	at	the	regional	level	and,	as	a	result,	at	the	local	level.	The	PAR	in	Aragón	and	UM	
in	the	Balearic	Islands	are	examples	of	such	parties	(see	Table	A.8	in	the	Appendix).		
22	The	way	we	deal	with	undefined	and/or	local	parties	is	relevant	for	the	computation	of	the	forcing	
variable	 (as	 we	 discuss	 later),	 but	 not	 for	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 alignment	 treatment,	 since	 these	
parties	do	not	hold	the	regional	presidency	and,	as	such,	are	excluded	from	the	main	definition	of	
alignment	used.		
23	 We	 believe	 this	 assumption	 to	 be	 plausible	 in	 Spain	 given	 the	 importance	 of	 vote	 transfers	
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simultaneously	affect	all	the	parties	within	the	regional	incumbent’s	ideological	bloc24,25,	so	
we	subtract	votes	not	just	from	the	party	holding	the	marginal	seat	but	from	all	parties	in	
the	bloc	 in	proportion	 to	 the	 initial	 votes	 received	by	each	party.	 Intuitively,	 our	method	
works	as	if	we	were	subtracting	small	numbers	of	votes	from	one	of	the	blocs,	distributing	
these	 votes	 between	 the	 parties	 of	 that	 bloc	 according	 to	 their	 initial	 vote	 share,	 while	
keeping	the	number	of	votes	for	the	parties	of	the	other	bloc	constant.	As	we	subtract	more	
votes,	 seats	 start	 shifting	 from	one	bloc	 to	 the	other.	We	stop	subtracting	votes	when	we	
observe	a	shift	in	the	seat	majority	from	one	bloc	to	the	other	(i.e.,	when	the	last	seat	giving	
the	majority	to	one	bloc	moves	to	the	other	bloc).	The	number	of	votes	needed	to	reach	this	
stage,	divided	by	the	total	number	of	votes,	is	our	forcing	variable.26	The	measure	is	easy	to	
compute	 for	 a	 single	 municipality	 (codification	 is	 needed	 when	 you	 have	 thousands	 of	
them)	and	is	also	very	intuitive.	Proof	of	that	is	its	use	by	the	media	to	assess	the	closeness	
of	an	election	(either	based	on	poll	data	or	during	election	night	itself).	See,	for	example,	the	
following	excerpt:	
“The	 vote	 count	was	a	bitter	 experience	 for	 the	 leaders	of	PP	and	PSOE	 (in	 the	
municipality	 of	 A	 Estrada,	 in	 Galicia),	whose	 dispute	 for	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	
municipal	government	went	down	 to	 the	wire.	The	PP	 saw	 its	absolute	majority	
disappear	 for	a	while	and,	with	 it,	 its	 control	of	 the	 executive.	An	urban	polling	
station	was	 the	 last	 to	send	 in	 its	count	and	when	 it	did	so	 it	unleashed	 the	PP’s	
euphoria.	The	list	headed	by	José	López	Campos	kept	the	government	in	power	by	a	
few	score	of	votes”.	(El	Faro	de	Vigo,	05/25/2015)	
Of	course,	despite	being	intuitive,	the	measure	might	also	be	inaccurate	and	this	is	why	we	
also	compute	the	forcing	variable	using	alternative	vote	migration	scenarios.	We	consider	
that	 a	 vote	 might	 go	 (come)	 not	 just	 from	 (to)	 abstention	 but	 also	 from	 (to)	 the	 other	
ideological	bloc,	 as	well	 as	 a	 combination	of	 these	 two	assumptions.27	 In	 any	 case,	 as	we	
                                                                                                                                                              
from/to	 abstention	 during	 the	 period	 of	 analysis.	 This	 can	 be	 documented	 by	 examining	 the	
correlation	 between	 turnout	 and	 the	 left‐wing	 share	 of	 the	 vote.	 Using	 district‐level	 national	
elections	data,	Lago	(2010)	reports	a	value	of	0.5	for	this	correlation	in	the	case	of	the	socialist	vote	
share	(i.e.,	PSOE).	Using	municipal‐level	data,	we	find	roughly	the	same	correlation.	
24	 The	 vote	 outcomes	 of	 the	 two	 main	 left‐wing	 groups	 of	 parties	 are	 highly	 correlated.	 Using	
municipal‐level	data	for	our	period	of	analysis,	we	find	a	statistically	significant	correlation	of	0.37	
between	the	increase	in	the	socialist	vote	share	(PSOE)	and	the	increase	in	the	vote	share	of	more	
extreme	left‐wing	parties.	
25	This	is	less	relevant	in	the	right‐wing	bloc,	since	there	is	usually	only	one	dominant	party.	
26	In	Table	A.3	in	the	Appendix	we	provide	the	algebraic	formulation	for	the	more	basic	case,	i.e.,	the	
one	in	which	the	bloc	holding	a	seat	majority	has	only	one	seat	in	excess	and	it	is	clear	that	the	next	
seat	to	be	allocated	belongs	to	the	opposition	bloc.	In	Table	A.5	we	provide	a	numerical	example	to	
illustrate	 how	 this	 might	 work	 in	 a	 more	 complicated	 scenario	 (i.e.	 the	 seat	 share	 difference	
between	 government	 and	 opposition	 is	 larger	 than	 one).	 The	 Stata	 code	 used	 to	 compute	 this	
variable	is	available	upon	request.	
27 In	Table	A.6	in	the	Appendix	we	provide	a	numerical	example.	 
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show	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 the	 results	 do	 not	 change	 greatly	 when	 using	 this	 alternative	
forcing	variable.		
Regional‐level	electoral	competition.	Our	measures	of	electoral	competition	are	based	
on	 the	difference	between	 the	 seat	 shares	 controlled	by	 the	 regional	president	 and	 those	
controlled	 by	 the	 opposition	 (henceforth,	 Regional	 seat	margin).	 The	 resulting	 figure	 is	
demeaned.	We	use	seats	instead	of	votes	because	regional	elections	have	multiple	districts	
and	 different	 degrees	 of	 proportionality	 in	 different	 regions,	 which	 renders	 vote	 shares	
meaningless	 (see	 e.g.,	 Strom,	 1989).	 Note	 also	 that	 the	 purpose	 here	 is	 different	 to	 that	
when	 we	 were	 computing	 the	 forcing	 variable	 with	 local	 election	 data:	 in	 that	 case	 we	
sought	to	make	treated	and	control	groups	comparable,	whereas	here	we	seek	to	capture	
differences	in	electoral	competition	across	regions.		
The	 three	 measures	 we	 use	 differ	 in	 their	 degree	 of	 inclusiveness	 of	 the	 parties	
supporting	 and	 opposing	 the	 regional	 president.	 In	 the	 first	 measure,	 we	 compute	 the	
Regional	seat	margin	 as	 the	difference	between	 the	seat	 share	of	 the	parties	 that	actually	
support	 the	regional	president	 in	the	parliament	(i.e.,	 those	voting	YES	 in	the	investiture)	
and	 the	 seat	 share	 of	 the	 parties	 that	 do	 not	 support	 the	 president.	Here	we	 include	 the	
main	 parties	 in	 the	 opposition	 bloc,	 that	 is,	 those	 parties	 that	 belong	 to	 a	 different	
ideological	 bloc	 (and	 so	 the	 ones	 that	 voted	 NO	 in	 the	 investiture),	 and	 there	 is	 enough	
evidence	 to	 suggest	 they	 would	 agree	 to	 elect	 a	 candidate	 from	 that	 group.	 This	 is	 our	
preferred	measure	since	 it	 is	a	much	more	accurate	depiction	of	 the	 threats	 the	different	
regional	governments	actually	 face.	 In	 the	 second	measure,	we	expand	 the	definition	and	
include	 the	 seats	 of	 all	 the	 parties	 included	 in	 the	 two	 ideological	 blocs;	 in	 this	 case,	
however,	 we	 exclude	 some	 parties	 that	 for	 specific	 reasons	 (i.e.,	 radical	 preferences,	
conflictive	 scissions)	are	unwilling	 to	vote	 for	 an	 ideologically	 close	party.	The	difference	
between	this	and	the	first	measure	 is	that,	 in	some	cases,	 it	expands	the	seat	share	of	 the	
regional	president,	since	it	allows	the	president	to	count	on	ideologically	close	parties	that	
do	 not	 actually	 belong	 to	 the	 ruling	 coalition	 (i.e.,	 because	 the	 party	 is	 a	 single‐party	
government	or	because	the	president	picked	a	centrist	regionalist	party	as	a	partner)28.	The	
disadvantage	 of	 this	 second	measure	 is	 that	 it	 relies	 on	 hypothetical	 rather	 than	 on	 real	
alliances.	The	 third	measure	compares	 the	seat	shares	of	 the	main	parties	 in	government	
and	in	opposition.	Research	on	local	government	coalition	formation	in	countries	with	a	PR	
system	shows	that	a	party’s	seat	share	is	the	variable	that	best	predicts	whether	this	party	
is	 going	 to	 win	 control	 of	 the	 government	 (e.g.,	 Skjæveland	 and	 Serritzlew,	 2009).	 A	
                                                 
28	This	might	be	important	in	some	cases.	Take	for	example,	the	case	of	Andalusia,	where	the	PSOE	
has	been	in	government	since	the	beginning	of	democracy.		The	number	of	seats	held	by	this	party	is	
not	that	great,	but	there	are	two	parties	in	its	bloc	(PA	and	IU)	that	provide	a	sort	of	buffer,	because	
they	are	unlikely	to	allow	a	candidate	from	the	PP	to	become	president.	
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shortcoming	of	 this	variable	 is	 that	 it	neglects	 the	 fact	 that,	on	 some	occasions,	 there	are	
parties	 in	 the	 opposition	 bloc	 that	 are	 ideologically	 close	 and	 prone	 to	 reaching	 an	
agreement	even	without	a	pre‐electoral	coalition29.	As	we	said,	our	preferred	measure	is	the	
first.	Thus,	we	present	 the	detailed	results	 for	 this	variable	and	only	 the	main	results	are	
presented	for	the	other	two	in	the	robustness	checks.	
Control	 variables.	 In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 further	 check	 of	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 RDD	
results	 and	 to	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 of	 our	 estimates,	 we	 also	 present	 results	 when	
controlling	 for	 several	 covariates:	 log(Population),	 Population	 density,	 Property	 tax	 rate,	
Assessed	property	value,	and	Local	debt	(see	Solé‐Ollé	and	Sorribas‐Navarro,	2008).		
5.	Results	
5.1.	Exploring	the	discontinuity	
Panel	 (a)	 in	 Figure	 1	 plots	 the	 seat	margin	 of	 the	 regional	 incumbent’s	 bloc	 at	 the	 local	
elections	 against	 its	 alignment	 status,	which	 is	 given	 a	 value	of	 one	 if	 the	mayor	 and	 the	
regional	president	belong	 to	 the	same	party.	The	graph	shows	a	considerable	 jump	when	
the	 ideological	bloc	of	the	regional	 incumbent	moves	 from	‐1	seat	 to	+1	seat	 (i.e.,	when	it	
requires	one	additional	seat	to	gain/lose	a	majority	of	seats).		
Although	it	might	seem	appropriate	to	perform	the	analysis	by	comparing	the	average	
value	of	 transfers	 for	 the	municipalities	 located	 at	 the	 ‐1	 and	+1	 seat	margin	values,	 this	
would	not	be	entirely	correct,	 since	 this	 is	quite	a	 large	group	with	 considerable	 internal	
variability	in	the	popularity	of	the	party	of	the	regional	incumbent30.	For	this	reason,	we	use	
the	vote	margin	as	the	forcing	variable,	computed	as	the	percentage	of	votes	needed	for	the	
regional	incumbent’s	bloc	to	win	(lose)	a	majority	of	seats	on	the	city	council.	Panel	(b)	in	
Figure	1	shows	the	plot	between	this	forcing	variable	and	the	alignment	status.	From	this	
figure,	we	see	 that	 there	 is	a	big	 jump	 in	 the	probability	of	alignment	when	moving	 from	
positive	to	negative	values	near	the	threshold.		
Figure	1	
Panel	 (a)	 in	 Table	 1	 shows	 the	 results	 obtained	 when	 estimating	 the	 discontinuity	
either	 with	 a	 flexible	 polynomial	 or	 with	 a	 local	 linear	 regression.	 When	 using	 the	 first	
approach,	the	Akaike	information	criterion	suggests	that	it	is	optimal	to	fit	a	second‐order	
polynomial.	 In	this	case,	 the	estimated	value	of	the	discontinuity	in	the	first	stage	(i.e.	 the	
discontinuity	in	the	probability	of	alignment)	is	70%.	The	results	do	not	change	much	with	
                                                 
29	Consider,	for	example,	the	case	of	the	four‐party	left‐wing	coalition	in	the	Balearic	Islands	or	the	
coalitions	between	the	PSOE	and	BNG	in	Galicia	(see	Table	A.7	in	the	Appendix	for	details).	
30	The	percentage	of	votes	needed	to	win/lose	this	last	seat	might	be	as	high	as	15%.	
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other	 polynomial	 orders,	 when	 control	 variables	 are	 added	 or	 when	 a	 local	 linear	
regression	is	used.		
Table	1	
A	 possible	 concern	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 RDD	 is	 that	 the	 forcing	 variable	 might	 be	
manipulated31.	A	way	of	verifying	that	this	not	the	case	is	to	examine	its	histogram	or,	more	
formally,	 test	 for	 the	 continuity	 of	 this	 variable	 at	 the	 cut‐off	 by	 running	 local	 linear	
regressions	 of	 the	 log	 of	 the	 density	 separately	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 zero	 threshold	 (see	
Figure	 2).	 We	 performed	 both	 checks	 and	 found	 no	 evidence	 of	 manipulation.	 Another	
validity	 check	 involves	 testing	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 discontinuity	 in	 the	 pre‐determined	
covariates	used	as	controls	and	further	observables	that	are	potential	confounders.	None	of	
these	variables	is	discontinuous	around	the	threshold32.		
Figure	2	
5.2.	Partisan	alignment	and	transfers		
Panel	(b)	of	Table	1	presents	the	RD	estimates	of	the	LATE,	which	correspond	to	the	second	
stage	of	a	2SLS	regression	where	the	dependent	variable	is	capital	transfers	per	capita.	The	
2SLS	coefficients	associated	with	the	optimal	polynomial	are	around	92	euros.		This	amount	
has	to	be	compared	with	the	transfers	received	by	unaligned	municipalities	just	at	the	left	
of	 the	 cut‐off,	 which	 are	 around	 99.82	 euros	 per	 capita.	 Thus,	 an	 aligned	 municipality	
would,	on	average,	receive	92%	more	per	capita	transfers	than	a	similar	unaligned	one.	The	
estimated	 LATE	 is	 robust	 to	 the	 use	 of	 different	 polynomial	 orders	 (columns	 (i)	 to	 (iii)	
report	results	for	polynomial	orders	1	to	3),	to	the	introduction	of	control	variables	in	the	
equation	 (see	 column	 (iv)),	 and	 to	 the	 use	 of	 local	 linear	 regression	 (see	 column	 (v)	 for	
results	with	the	21%	bandwidth).	
The	 results	are	 statistically	 significant,	 robust,	 and	quantitatively	meaningful.	At	 the	
threshold,	 in	 competitive	 local	 elections,	 aligned	municipalities	 receive	 twice	 the	 amount	
obtained	by	their	unaligned	counterparts.	The	degree	of	party	favoritism	in	the	allocation	of	
these	transfers	therefore	seems	very	high.	However,	the	impact	on	local	public	finances	is	
not	 so	 great	 once	 the	 share	 of	 the	 transfers	 in	 local	 budgets	 has	 been	 accounted	 for.	
Transfers	 from	 regional	 governments	 represent	 54%	of	 the	 capital	 transfers	 received	 by	
municipalities,	which	in	turn	represent	20.52%	of	local	capital	spending.	Therefore,	a	92%	
increase	 in	 such	 transfers	 would	 help	 municipalities	 increase	 their	 capital	 spending	 by	
18.9%	 (=92%	 ×	 20.52%).	 Note	 also	 that	 the	 grants	 we	 examine	 here	 are	 especially	
                                                 
31 Note	that	in	any	case	manipulation	is	less	of	a	concern	in	a	PR	system,	where	the	outcome	of	the	
election	depends	on	the	votes	for	all	different	parties,	the	workings	of	a	complex	rule	that	converts	
votes	into	seats,	and	the	uncertainty	of	post‐election	coalition	bargaining	(see	Folke	et	al.,	2015,	for	
an	extended	discussion).	
32	These	results	are	reported	in	Table	A.12	in	the	Appendix.		
25
susceptible	 to	 favoritism,	 because	 they	 are	 discretionary	 project	 grants	 and	 are	 less	
amenable	 to	distribution	by	 formula.	This	 is	not	 so	obvious	 in	 the	case	of	 current	grants,	
which	 represent	 a	 large	 share	 of	 revenues	 and	 for	 which	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	
favoritism.33	
The	discontinuity	in	transfers	around	the	cut‐off	is	illustrated	in	Figure	3,	which	shows	
the	 plot	 between	 a	 second‐order	 polynomial	 of	 the	 forcing	 variable	 and	 the	 amount	
received	 in	 capital	 transfers.	 The	 graph	 confirms	 the	 evidence	 of	 a	 clear	 and	 sizeable	
discontinuity	 around	 the	 threshold:	 municipalities	 marginally	 to	 the	 right	 of	 the	 cut‐off	
(those	 likely	 to	 be	 aligned)	 receive	 much	 greater	 amounts	 of	 transfers	 than	 those	
marginally	to	the	left	(those	likely	to	be	unaligned)34.	
	Figure	3	
The	 last	 column	 in	 Table	 1	 also	 reports	 the	 DiD	 coefficient.	 The	 effect	 estimated	 is	
around	51.70	euros	and,	therefore,	much	smaller	than	that	obtained	when	using	the	RDD.	
There	are	two	possible	explanations	for	this	difference.	First,	the	RDD	can	be	considered	as	
causal,	but	this	is	less	clearly	the	case	for	the	DiD	estimates.	For	instance,	it	might	well	be	
that	some	local	governments	switched	 from	being	unaligned	to	aligned	after	 the	previous	
local	 election,	 and	 that	 higher	 transfers	were	 the	 cause	 of	 this.	Note	 that	 this	 could	have	
generated	 differences	 between	 the	 transfers	 received	 by	 governments	 that	 moved	 from	
being	unaligned	to	aligned	and	by	the	governments	that	remained	unaligned.	This	suggests	
that	the	DiD	estimates	might	be	biased	downwards.	Second,	the	DiD	might	be	an	estimate	of	
the	ATE	–	recall	that	our	model	suggests	that	the	ATE	should	be	smaller	than	the	LATE	(i.e.,	
the	 DiD	 estimate	 should	 be	 smaller	 than	 the	 RDD	 estimate).	 To	 see	 which	 of	 the	 two	
explanations	 is	more	plausible,	we	re‐estimated	our	DiD	equation	by	 incorporating	a	 lead	
and	a	lag.	Since	we	only	have	three	cross‐sections,	the	only	thing	we	can	do	(without	having	
to	exclude	the	fixed	effects)	is	to	provide	estimates	for	the	two	first	cross‐sections	including	
a	lead	of	alignment	in	the	equation	(in	addition	to	the	contemporaneous	alignment)	and	for	
the	 last	 two‐cross	 sections	 including	 a	 lag	 of	 alignment.	 It	 transpires	 that	 the	 effect	 of	
contemporaneous	alignment	is	very	similar	when	using	just	the	first	two	cross‐sections	and	
that	neither	the	lead	nor	the	lag	in	alignment	are	statistically	significant	and	the	coefficients	
are	very	small	(the	results	are	presented	in	Table	A.9	in	the	Appendix).	This	tells	us	that	the	
                                                 
33	 Current	 transfers	 represent	 a	 larger	 share	 of	 the	 local	 budget:	 they	 account	 for	 one	 third	 of	
current	revenues.	We	have	also	examined	the	impact	of	partisan	alignment	on	current	grants	(which	
are	formula‐based)	and	we	find	that	the	treatment	effect	 is	statistically	insignificant.	These	results	
are	not	presented	for	reasons	of	space,	but	are	available	upon	request.	
34	 The	magnitude	 of	 the	 jump	 is	 the	 coefficient	 of	 the	 reduced	 form	 (not	 shown	 in	 the	 table,	 but	
available	 upon	 request).	 Provided	 that	 the	 order	 of	 the	 polynomial	 used	 to	 estimate	 the	 reduced	
form	is	the	same	as	that	used	in	the	2SLS	estimation,	the	reduced	form	coefficient	will	be	equal	to	
the	product	of	the	2SLS	coefficient	and	the	first‐stage	estimate.	
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capital	 transfers	 of	municipalities	 switching	 and	not	 switching	 their	 alignment	 status	 are	
evolving	 similarly	and	also	 that	 the	extra	grants	allocated	 to	 aligned	governments	do	not	
spillover	 to	 future	 terms	of	office	 (and	so	 to	 local	governments	 that	might	not	be	aligned	
anymore).	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 DiD	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 estimate	 of	 the	 ATE.	
However,	given	the	paucity	of	the	data	used	for	the	placebo	test,	this	result	should	be	taken	
with	caution.	
5.3.	The	role	of	regional‐level	electoral	competition	
In	 this	 section,	 we	 present	 the	 results	 of	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 HLATE,	which	 allows	 the	
intensity	of	party	favoritism	in	the	allocation	of	transfers	to	vary	with	the	level	of	regional	
electoral	 competition.	 This	 effect	 is	 estimated	 by	 including	 an	 interaction	 between	
alignment	and	 the	Regional	seat	margin.	As	discussed	 in	previous	sections,	 the	validity	of	
the	HLATE	estimates	relies	on	the	fact	that	the	source	of	heterogeneity	(regional	electoral	
competition)	must	be	continuous	at	the	threshold.	In	Figure	4,	we	show	that	this	is	indeed	
the	 case.	 The	 graph	 plots	 bin	 averages	 of	 the	 Regional	 seat	margin	 against	 our	 forcing	
variable,	 the	 solid	 line	 corresponding	 to	 a	 second‐order	 polynomial	 (which	 is	 also	 the	
optimal	order	in	this	case).	No	evidence	of	a	discontinuity	appears.	
	Figure	4	
In	 Table	 2,	 we	 present	 empirical	 evidence	 that,	 when	 regional	 incumbents	 face	
uncontested	 regional	 elections,	 the	 level	 of	 party	 favoritism	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 transfers	
increases.	As	indicated	in	equation	(9)	above,	this	effect	is	captured	by	the	interaction	term	
between	the	indicator	of	electoral	competition	and	the	alignment	dummy	(a	×	Regional	seat	
margin).	The	 first	 three	columns	 in	 this	 table	report	 the	RDD	results,	while	 the	 last	 three	
report	 those	 of	 the	 DiD	 estimates.	 As	 in	 the	 bottom	 panels	 of	 Table	 1,	 the	 RDD	 results	
shown	in	Table	2	are	the	second	stage	of	2SLS	regressions,	where	the	alignment	dummy	(a)	
is	 instrumented	with	 the	 treatment	 dummy	 (d).	 The	 polynomial	 of	 the	 vote	margin	 is	 of	
second	 order	 (the	 optimal	 degree,	 as	 discussed)	 and	 is	 fully	 interacted	with	 the	 regional	
seat	margin.	The	 results	 are	 not	 affected	by	whether	we	do	or	do	not	 control	 for	 term	×	
region	fixed	effects	and	other	covariates.		
Table	2	
In	 all	 cases,	 the	 coefficient	 of	 the	 interaction	 variable	 (a	 ×	Regional	 seat	margin)	 is	
statistically	significant	and	positive.	As	expected,	the	more	uncontested	a	regional	election	
is,	the	higher	the	amount	of	discrimination	we	observe.	The	coefficient	of	the	interaction	in	
our	preferred	specification	is	5.07	euros,	which	indicates	that	raising	the	seat	share	of	the	
regional	 government	 (i.e.	 decreasing	 electoral	 competition)	 by	 one	 standard	 deviation	
relative	 to	 the	 average	 translates	 into	 a	 38‐euro	 per	 capita	 (=7.44×5.07)	 increase	 in	 the	
treatment	effect,	which	is	equivalent	to	a	41%	increase	in	the	HLATE	(=38/92).	Panel	(a)	in	
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Figure	5	plots	the	RDD	marginal	effects	against	the	value	of	the	Regional	seat	margin.	The	
graph	 highlights	 the	 range	 of	 variation	 in	 the	 party	 favoritism	 effect:	 the	marginal	 effect	
ranges	 from	0	 to	250	euros	 from	one	extreme	 to	 the	other	of	 the	x‐axis,	with	an	average	
around	100.	In	regions	with	a	level	of	electoral	competition	one	standard	deviation	above	
the	average	of	aligned	mayors	 receive	143%	more	 transfers	 than	unaligned	mayors.	This	
effect	 falls	 to	60%	in	regions	with	a	 level	of	electoral	competition	one	standard	deviation	
below	the	average.	This	heterogeneity	may	help	explain	better	the	magnitude	of	our	 local	
average	treatment	effect	compared	to	that	reported	elsewhere.		
	Figure	5	
The	 table	 also	 reports	 the	 DiD	 results	 (in	 the	 last	 three	 columns).	 The	 results	 are	
similar	 to	 those	 of	 the	 RDD	 estimates.	 Party	 favoritism	 increases	 with	 the	 degree	 of	
electoral	competition	at	the	regional	level.	As	in	Table	1,	the	average	effect	(captured	by	the	
non‐interacted	 coefficient)	 is	 smaller	 than	 the	 LATE.	 The	 coefficient	 of	 the	 interaction	 is	
also	 smaller,	 but	 still	 quite	 sizable	 (around	 2.5).	 Panel	 (b)	 of	 Figure	 5	 shows	 the	 DiD	
marginal	effects.	The	picture	that	emerges	is	very	similar	to	the	one	discussed	before.			
5.4.	Confounding	factors	
In	order	to	check	that	the	heterogeneous	effects	we	report	are	in	fact	due	to	differences	in	
the	degree	of	electoral	 competition,	we	run	similar	 regressions	 to	 those	 in	Table	2.	Here,	
however,	 in	 addition,	we	 include	 interactions	 of	 the	 treatment	 dummy	with	 confounding	
factors	 (measured	 at	 the	 regional	 level)	 that	 may	 be	 correlated	 with	 our	 measure	 of	
regional	electoral	competition	(see	Table	3)35.		
In	 Panel	 (a)	 of	 that	 table	 we	 explore	 the	 possible	 role	 of	 the	 situation	 of	 public	
finances,	since	it	is	reasonable	to	expect	that	fiscal	stress	might	eventually	affect	the	ability	
of	the	regional	government	to	allocate	transfers	to	municipalities.	We	include	interactions	
with	regional	revenues	per	capita	(which	 include	revenues	coming	 from	revenue‐sharing,	
taxes	 and	 intergovernmental	 grants)	 and	 with	 the	 debt	 burden	 (i.e.,	 debt	 as	 a	 share	 of	
current	revenues).	We	also	include	the	average	population	density	of	the	municipalities	in	
the	region,	as	smaller	towns	are	much	more	reliant	on	grants	of	this	kind	than	are	big	cities.	
Finally,	 another	 relevant	 factor	 is	 whether	 a	 municipality	 belongs	 to	 a	 single‐province	
region.	In	such	regions	the	amount	of	grants	allocated	by	the	regional	government	is	higher	
(i.e.,	 the	 regional	 government	 assumes	 the	 responsibilities	 and	 the	 resources	 of	 both	 the	
region	and	the	province)	and	this	may	 influence	regional	electoral	competition	as	well	as	
the	 incentives	 to	 discriminate	 between	 alignment	 and	 unaligned	 governments.	 Thus,	 we	
introduce	in	the	regression	a	dummy	variable	equal	to	one	if	the	municipality	is	in	a	region	
                                                 
35 See	Table	A.2	for	the	definition	of	these	variables,	data	sources	and	descriptive	statistics. 
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with	only	one	province.	The	results	show	that	party	favoritism	is	stronger	in	regions	with	
more	 current	 revenues,	 lower	 debt	 burden	 and	 less	 densely	 populated	 municipalities.	
These	 effects	 are	 statistically	 significant.	 Importantly,	 the	 coefficient	 of	 the	Regional	 seat	
margin	 is	 still	 positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 95%	 level	 in	 all	 cases.	 The	
coefficient	is	slightly	smaller	than	that	reported	in	Table	2,	but	the	marginal	effects	offer	the	
same	qualitative	picture	(complete	results	are	available	upon	request).		
Table	3	
In	Panel	(b),	we	report	the	results	when	including	interactions	with	variables	related	
to	 the	 incentives	 to	 discriminate	 faced	 by	 regional	 politicians.	 These	 alternative	 political	
mechanisms	are	not	necessarily	incompatible	with	the	main	story	studied	in	this	paper.	The	
first	factor	is	tenure	in	office	(i.e.,	number	of	consecutive	terms	in	office).	It	might	be	argued	
that	 the	 longer	 a	party	 stays	 in	office	 the	more	 time	 the	 regional	 incumbent	has	 to	build	
alliances	with	local	actors	and	the	greater	the	likelihood	of	discrimination	in	the	allocation	
of	transfers.	Another	potential	factor	is	the	timing	of	regional	and	local	elections:	it	might	be	
that	 some	 regions	 choose	 (when	 designing	 their	 basic	 laws)	 to	 alternate	 these	 elections	
precisely	 to	 isolate	 local	 governments	 from	 the	 political	 interference	 of	 regional	
incumbents,	and	that	this	has	some	influence	on	the	degree	of	electoral	competition	region‐
wide.	 Therefore,	 we	 include	 in	 the	 estimation	 an	 interaction	 between	 our	 treatment	
indicator	and	a	dummy	equal	to	one	if	regional	and	local	elections	are	concurrent.	Finally,	
informed	voters	might	not	be	very	 tolerant	of	discrimination	 in	 transfers	between	places.	
To	account	 for	 this,	we	 include	 interactions	between	 the	alignment	and	 the	 level	of	press	
circulation	 and,	 also,	 with	 the	 percentage	 of	 educated	 residents.	 We	 do	 not	 find	 any	
evidence	 that	 favoritism	 increases	 with	 tenure	 in	 office,	 but	 we	 do	 find	 evidence	 that	
favoritism	is	greater	in	places	where	elections	are	concurrent,	and	where	press	circulation	
is	 lower.	 In	 any	 case,	 however,	 the	 introduction	of	 these	 additional	 interactions	does	not	
have	 any	 impact	 on	 the	 electoral	 competition	 results.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 coefficient	 and	 its	
statistical	significance	remains	and	the	marginal	effects	are	similar.	Therefore,	 the	 finding	
that	party	favoritism	is	greater	in	regions	with	less	political	competition	is	resistant	to	the	
consideration	of	other	plausible	influences.	
5.5.	Robustness	checks		
The	 results	 are	 also	 robust	 to	 changes	 in	 key	 aspects	 of	 the	methodology	 employed	 (see	
Tables	 A.10	 and	 A.11	 in	 the	 Appendix).	 	 First,	 we	 show	 that	 the	 results	 are	 robust	 to	
changes	in	the	definition	of	alignment	and	in	the	way	we	compute	the	forcing	variable.	Both	
the	LATE	and	the	HLATE	results	are	very	similar	when	using	other	(more	comprehensive)	
measures	of	alignment.	We	report	the	results	 for	two	of	these	measures	(see	Table	A.10):	
Partner	alignment,	defined	as	a	dummy	equal	to	one	when	any	of	the	main	partners	in	the	
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coalition	at	both	levels	(i.e.,	not	just	the	president	or	the	mayor)	belongs	to	the	same	party;	
and,	Bloc	alignment	(i.e.,	the	party	of	the	president	and	that	of	the	mayor	belong	to	the	same	
ideological	bloc).	The	results	remain	unchanged.	The	results	also	remain	unchanged	when	
we	exclude	 from	 the	estimation	municipalities	 in	which	 local	parties	and	regional	parties	
that	 cannot	 easily	 be	 classified	 are	 represented	 on	 local	 councils,	 and	 when	 using	 an	
alternative	 forcing	 variable	 (i.e.,	 that	 computed	 assuming	 that	 votes	 are	 transferred	 not	
only	from	abstention	but	also	from	the	opposition	bloc)36.	Second,	the	results	are	also	very	
similar	when	we	use	as	a	measure	of	regional	electoral	competition	the	seat	shares	of	all	the	
parties	in	the	blocs	of	the	president	and	the	opposition	(see	Table	A.11	in	the	Appendix).	It	
appears	 not	 to	matter	whether	we	 use	 actual	 or	 hypothetical	 coalitions.	 The	measure	 of	
regional	 electoral	 competition	 that	uses	 the	 seat	 shares	of	 the	 two	main	parties	does	not	
work	particularly	well.	The	 interacted	 term	is	smaller	and	not	 statistically	significant	and	
the	marginal	 effects	 become	 statistically	different	 from	zero	 at	much	 larger	 values	of	 the	
variable.	 The	 problem	 with	 this	 measure	 is	 that	 it	 misclassifies	 some	 situations	 where	
although	 the	 first	 party	 has	 a	 clear	 advantage	 over	 the	 second,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 to	 win	 a	
majority	in	the	parliament	and	so	to	get	enough	support	to	win	the	regional	presidency.	
5.5.	Discussion	
Thus,	up	to	this	juncture,	we	have	shown	that	aligned	local	governments	do	indeed	receive	
more	 transfers	 than	 those	 obtained	 by	 unaligned	 local	 councils	 and	 that	 the	 difference	
between	 the	 two	 is	 much	 greater	 the	 lower	 the	 level	 of	 regional	 electoral	 competition.	
These	 results	 are	 statistically	 significant,	 quantitatively	 meaningful,	 and	 highly	 robust.	
However,	although	the	results	are	consistent	with	the	predictions	of	our	theoretical	model,	
they	might	also	be	consistent	with	other	theories	regarding	the	motivations	of	politicians.	
First,	the	regional	incumbent	might	allocate	more	transfers	to	local	governments	controlled	
by	 the	 same	party	 as	hers	 because	 she	 expects	 co‐partisans	 to	 channel	 back	 some	of	 the	
funds	to	her.	For	example,	local	governments	may	obtain	kickbacks	from	firms	undertaking	
public	works	 that	 are	 then	 transferred	 to	 the	 regional	 or	 national	 party	 to	 help	 fund	 its	
electoral	 campaigns.	 Note,	 however,	 that	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 such	 a	 scenario	 can	 be	
reconciled	 with	 our	 main	 prediction:	 lower	 electoral	 competition	 at	 the	 regional	 level	
reduces	campaign	finance	needs	and,	hence,	the	need	to	use	these	unorthodox	procedures.		
Second,	the	regional	incumbent	might	simply	expect	to	share	the	rents	generated	by	
the	public	works.	A	lower	level	of	regional	electoral	competition	could	foster	incentives	to	
                                                 
36The	 Appendix	 includes	 the	 plots	 of	 the	 alignment	 status	 and	 of	 capital	 transfers	 against	 the	
alternative	forcing	variable	(Figure	A.1).	These	figures	show	that	the	size	of	the	discontinuity	at	the	
threshold	 is	 not	 sensitive	 to	 the	 assumptions	 made	 when	 computing	 the	 forcing	 variable.	 The	
Appendix	 also	 includes	 the	 histogram	 and	 the	McCrary	 graph	 of	 the	 alternative	 forcing	 variable,	
again	with	no	signs	of	manipulation	(Figure	A.2).	
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behave	in	this	way	(see,	e.g.,	Svaleryd	and	Vlachos,	2004),	so	the	main	prediction	in	such	a	
scenario	 and	 of	 our	 model	 is	 essentially	 the	 same.	 There	 are,	 however,	 several	
complementary	 pieces	 of	 evidence	 that	 suggest	 this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 the	 case.	 First,	 we	
would	 expect	 extended	 periods	 in	 office	 to	 help	 in	 the	 building	 of	 the	 networks	 that	
politicians	use	to	extract	these	rents,	but	we	did	not	find	any	evidence	that	tenure	in	office	
had	 any	 effect	 on	 party	 favoritism.	 Second,	 this	 alternative	 theory	would	 not	 necessarily	
predict	that	the	LATE	should	be	larger	than	the	ATE,	which	is	what	the	comparison	of	our	
RDD	and	DiD	results	tentatively	suggests.	Rather,	 this	alternative	theory	suggests	that	the	
local	mayors	that	are	best	able	to	extract	bribes	from	public	works	firms	and	to	share	them	
with	 comrades	 at	 higher	 levels	 are	 precisely	 those	 that	 won	 the	 local	 election	 by	 the	
greatest	margin	 (and	 so	have	no	 fear	of	 losing	 the	next	 election	 if	 they	 extract	 too	many	
rents	or	 if	 they	are	caught	 in	a	corruption	scandal).	 It	could	be	shown	that	 in	this	 type	of	
model	 the	 ATE	 could	 in	 fact	 be	 greater	 than	 the	 LATE:	 transfers	 would	 jump	 at	 the	
threshold	 (a	 mayor	 places	 more	 trust	 in	 her	 co‐partisans	 than	 in	 the	 opposition)	 but	
continue	growing	as	aligned	mayors	become	more	and	more	popular.		
6.	Conclusion	
In	 this	 paper,	we	 have	 examined	 the	way	 in	which	 competition	 in	 regional	 elections	 can	
affect	 the	 incentives	 of	 regional‐level	 incumbents	 to	 discriminate	 in	 favor	 of	 aligned	
municipalities.	We	 first	 present	 a	 simple	 theoretical	model	 in	which	 regional	 incumbents	
face	a	 trade‐off	when	deciding	how	to	allocate	grants	 to	 lower‐layer	governments.	On	the	
one	hand,	they	are	concerned	about	winning	the	next	regional	election;	on	the	other,	they	
wish	 to	maximize	 the	 number	 of	 aligned	mayors,	 which	 in	 the	 long	 run	 should	 help	 the	
regional	 incumbent	 increase	 her	 political	 capital	 and	 win	 future	 elections.	 The	 main	
hypothesis	 derived	 from	 this	 model	 is	 that	 when	 the	 regional	 incumbent	 performed	
particularly	strongly	 in	 the	previous	election,	and	so	believes	her	re‐election	prospects	 to	
be	 high,	 she	 can	 concentrate	 her	 efforts	 on	 targeting	more	 resources	 towards	 her	 party	
comrades.		
To	 test	 the	 above	 hypothesis,	 we	 have	 used	 capital	 transfers	 from	 regional	 to	 local	
governments	 in	 Spain	 and	 applied	 a	 ‘fuzzy’	 RDD	 that	 we	 adapt	 to	 a	 proportional	
representation	electoral	system.	To	begin	with,	we	document	whether	(and,	 if	so,	 to	what	
extent)	 regional	 incumbents	 favor	 aligned	 municipalities	 with	 disproportionally	 larger	
intergovernmental	 grants.	 We	 find	 that	 aligned	 municipalities,	 on	 average,	 obtain	 92%	
more	transfers	per	capita	than	are	obtained	by	unaligned	municipalities.	Such	a	difference	
would	enable	local	governments	to	increase	their	investments	by	19%.	Moreover,	the	initial	
RDD	 design	 is	 modified,	 as	 in	 Becker	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 local	 average	
treatment	 effects	 that	 are	 heterogeneous	 across	 regions	with	 different	 levels	 of	 electoral	
competition	 in	 regional	 elections.	 The	 results	 suggest	 that	 party	 favoritism	 is	 more	
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prevalent	when	the	president’s	party	won	the	previous	election	by	a	large	share	of	seats.	In	
regions	 with	 a	 low	 level	 of	 electoral	 competition	 (one	 standard	 deviation	 above	 the	
average),	 aligned	 mayors	 receive	 143%	 more	 transfers	 than	 are	 obtained	 by	 unaligned	
mayors.	 This	 effect	 falls	 to	 60%	 in	 regions	 with	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 competition.	 The	
differences	are	even	larger	in	the	most	extreme	cases.	This	result	suggests	that	the	degree	
of	party	favoritism	is	mediated	by	the	level	of	competition	in	the	elections:	in	places	where	
the	elections	are	largely	uncontested,	the	degree	of	party	favoritism	is	massive,	whereas	in	
places	where	the	elections	are	strongly	contested	favoritism	disappears.		
Our	results	shed	light	on	the	mechanisms	responsible	for	the	extreme	degree	of	party	
favoritism	in	the	allocation	of	transfers.	Some	complementary	sources	of	evidence	suggest	
that	 regional	 incumbents	 pursue	 a	 long‐term	 strategy,	 seeking	 to	 win	 additional	
mayoralties	and	to	strengthening	their	power	base	in	order	to	improve	their	performance	
in	future	elections.	The	evidence	here,	however,	 is	merely	suggestive	and	any	conclusions	
should	 be	 drawn	 with	 extreme	 care.	 For	 the	 time	 being,	 we	 know	 that	 discretionary	
transfers	 are	 subject	 to	 extreme	 levels	 of	 party	 favoritism	and	 that	 electoral	 competition	
matters,	but	more	research	is	required	to	obtain	a	full	understanding	of	the	motives	behind	
this	behavior.	
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Tables	and	figures		
	
Table	1:		Average	effect	of	partisan	alignment	on	capital	transfers.		
	 (i)	 (ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 (v)	 (vi)	
	 RD	 RD	 RD	 RD	 RD	 DiD	
	 (a)	First	stage	(Dep.	variable:	Alignment	status)	
d	 0.741	(53.911)***	
0.706	
(36.403)***
0.706	
(28.588)***
0.706	
(36.436)***
0.715	
(26.600)***	 ‐‐.‐‐			
R2	 0.749	 0.749	 0.749	 0.749	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	
AIC	 150.020	 140.214	 143.383	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	
	 (b)	Second	stage	(Dep.	variable:		Capital	transfers	per	capita)	
a	 82.08	(8.39)***	
91.56	
(6.23)***	
110.20	
(5.93)***	
89.84	
(6.41)***	
93.67	
(4.887)***	
51.70	
(8.47)***		
Polynomial	order	 1	 2	 3	 2	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	
Bandwidth	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 21%	 ‐‐.‐‐	
Region	×	Time	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Controls	 NO	 NO	 NO	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Observations	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 2,860	 6,056	
Notes:	(1)	1995‐99,	2000‐03	and	2004‐07	terms.	(2)	Panel	(a)	of	this	table	shows	the	first‐stage	estimates	
of	 a	 2SLS	 regression	 where	 the	 dependent	 variable	 is	 Alignment	 (a	 =	 1	 if	 the	 mayor	 and	 the	 regional	
president	belong	to	the	same	party).	(3)	Columns	(i)‐(v)	in	Panel	(b)	show	the	second‐stage	estimates	of	the	
2SLS	where	d	 is	used	as	an	 instrument	 for	the	alignment	dummy	a;	column	(vi)	shows	the	difference‐in‐
differences	 estimates.	 (4)	 t‐statistic	 in	 parentheses,	 robust	 standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	municipality	
level;	 ***,	 **	&	 *	 =	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 99%,	95%	and	90%	 levels.	 (5)	 Control	 variables	 included:	
log(Population),	Population	density,	Property	tax	rate,	Assessed	Property	Value	p.c.,	and	Local	Debt	p.c.	(7)	RD	
estimates	in	column	(v)	are	obtained	by	a	local	polynomial	IV	regression	using	an	Epanechnikov	kernel;	the	
estimates	 and	 the	 optimal	 bandwidth	 are	 based	 on	 the	 procedure	 proposed	 by	 Calonico,	 Cattaneo,	 and	
Titiunik	(2014).	
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Table	2:	Effect	of	regional	electoral	competition	on	party	favoritism.	
	 (i)	 (i)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 (v)	 (v)	
	 RD	 RD	 RD	 DiD	 DiD	 DiD	
a	 102.88	
(5.23)***	
	
99.33	
(5.52)***	
94.69	
(6.71)***	
57.68	
(4.02)***	
	
58.04	
(4.04)***	
	
56.26	
(4.03)***	
	
	
a	×	Regional	seat	margin	 5.61	
(2.44)**	
	
4.74
(2.22)**	
5.07
(2.76)***	
3.67	
(2.40)**	
	
3.10	
(2.11)*	
	
3.52	
(2.52)**	
	
	
Regional	seat	margin 0.23	
(0.16)	
	
0.40
(0.28)	
‐‐.‐‐ ‐0.55	
(‐0.43)	
	
‐0.49	
(‐0.59)	
‐‐.‐‐	
	
R2	 0.05	 0.11	 0.27	 0.19	 0.20	 0.24	
Region	×	Term	fixed	effects	 NO	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	 YES	
Controls	 NO	 YES	 YES	 NO	 YES	 YES	
Observations	 6,056	 6,056 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	
Notes:	 (1)	 Coefficients	 in	 columns	 (i)‐(iii)	 correspond	 to	 RD	 estimates	 and	 those	 of	 columns	 (iv)‐(vi)	 are	
difference‐in‐differences	 estimates.	 (2)	 Explanatory	 variable:	 Alignment	 dummy	 a;	 in	 columns	 (i)‐(iii)	 a	
instrumented	with	d	(see	Table	1);	columns	(i)‐(iii)	include	interactions	between	a	and	the	Regional	Seat	Margin	
variable,	 and	 a	 second‐order	 polynomial	 of	 the	 forcing	 variable	 fitted	 separately	 on	 either	 side	 of	 the	 zero	
threshold	 using	 the	 whole	 sample	 and	 also	 fully	 interacted	 with	 the	Regional	 Seat	Margin.	 (3)	Regional	 Seat	
Margin	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 seat	 shares	 of	 the	 parties	 in	 the	 regional	 government	 and	 those	 of	 the	
parties	in	the	opposition	in	the	previous	regional	election	(this	variable	is	demeaned).	(4)	The	control	variables	
are	the	same	as	in	Table	1.	(5)	Time	dummies	are	included	in	columns	(iv)	and	(v).	(6)	t‐statistic	in	parentheses,	
robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	the	regional	level;	***,	**	&	*	=	statistically	significant	at	the	99%,	95%	and	90%	
levels.(7)	See	Table	1.	
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Table	3:	Alternative	explanations.	
	 (i)	 (ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 (v)	 (vi)	 (vii)	 (viii)	
	 RD	 RD	 RD	 RD	 DiD	 DiD	 DiD	 DiD	
	 (a)	Financial	situation	
a	 92.96	
(7.00)***	
88.42	
(8.35)***
91.43	
(7.52)***
93.35	
(6.59)***
62.85	
(5.11)***
57.54	
(6.95)***	
59.33	
(5.92)***	
56.97	
(4.73)***
a	×	Regional	seat	margin	 3.59	
(2.74)***	
4.76	
(2.44)**
	
4.21	
(2.27)**
5.06	
(2.71)***
2.55	
(2.41)**
2.29	
(2.59)**	
2.28	
(2.42)**	
	
2.96	
(3.05)***
a	×	Revenues	p.c.	 0.05	
(6.88)***	
	
‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 0.03	
(3.13)***
‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	
a	×	Debt	burden	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐6.20	
(‐4.66)***
	
‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ ‐7.11	
(‐4.50)***
‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐
a	×	Population	density	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐ ‐0.19	
(‐2.38)**
‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐0.16	
(‐2.29)**	
	
‐‐.‐‐
a	×	Single	province	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 10.99	
(0.29)	
	
‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 24.58	
(0.92)	
	
	 	
	 (b)	Political	influences	
a	 94.75	
(6.88)***	
57.22	
(4.16)***
90.92	
(7.35)***
94.90	
(6.60)***
66.88	
(5.46)***
33.73	
(2.29)**	
66.53	
(8.02)***	
66.23	
(5.75)***
a	×	Regional	seat		margin	 4.54	
(2.65)***	
	
4.97	
(2.32)**
	
4.54	
(2.55)**
	
5.05	
(2.72)***
	
3.40	
(2.79)***
	
3.63	
(2.44)**	
	
3.12	
(2.89)***	
	
3.88	
(3.13)***
		
a	×	Tenure	in	office	 6.50	
(1.39)	
	
‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ 6.38	
(1.57)	
‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐
a	×	Concurrent	elections	 ‐‐.‐‐	 50.91	
(2.68)***
	
‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ 49.01	
(2.78)***	
‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐
a	×	Press	circulation	p.c.	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐ ‐0.73	
(‐2.41)**
‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐0.78	
(‐2.77)***
	
‐‐.‐‐
a	×	%	Educated	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ ‐0.34	
(‐0.01)
‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐0.12	
(‐0.00)
Observations	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	
Controls	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Region	×	Term	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Notes:	(1)	Control	variables	as	 in	Table	2.	(2)	Estimates	columns	(i)‐(iv)	correspond	to	RD	regressions,	while	those	 in	columns	
(v)‐(viii)	are	difference‐in‐differences	estimates.	 (3)	The	polynomial	order	of	 the	 forcing	variable	 is	 two	 (the	optimal	one)	and	
that	of	Regional	seat	margin	and	the	potential	confounders	is	one.	(4)	Revenues	p.c.	=	current	revenues	of	the	regional	government	
per	 capita	 (demeaned);	Debt	 burden	 	=	 regional	 debt	 burden	 (principal	 +	 interest)	 as	 share	 of	 current	 revenues	 (demeaned),	
Population	density	=	average	population	density	of	municipalities	in	the	region	(demeaned),	Single	province	=	equal	to	one	if	there	
are	no	provincial	 governments;	Tenure	 in	office	 =	number	of	 consecutive	 terms	 in	office	of	 the	party	of	 the	 regional	president	
(demeaned),	 Press	 circulation	 =	 newspaper	 copies	 per	 1,000	 inhabitants	 (in	 the	 province;	 demeaned);	 Concurrent	 elections	 =	
dummy	equal	to	one	if	regional	and	municipal	elections	are	held	at	the	same	time;	%	Educated	=	share	of	people	with	primary	and	
secondary	education;	(5)	t‐statistic	in	parentheses,	robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	the	regional	level;	***,	 **	&	*	=	statistically	
significant	at	the	99%,	95%	and	90%	levels.	(6)	See	Table	1.		
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Figure	1:	Alignment	v.	Forcing	variable	
a)	Seat	margin		 b)	Vote	margin	
Notes:	 (1)	1995‐99,	2000‐03	and	2004‐07	 terms.	 	 (Obs=	6,056).	 (2)	Alignment	Regional‐Local	=	1	 if	 the	mayor	and	 the	
regional	president	belong	to	the	same	party.	(3)	Regional	incumbent’s	bloc	seat	margin	=	distance	in	local	council	seats	to	a	
change	 in	 the	 ideological	bloc’s	 seat	majority(4)	Regional	 incumbent’s	bloc	vote	margin	=	distance	 in	percentage	of	 local	
election	votes	to	a	change	in	the	ideological	bloc’s	seat	majority;	seats	and	votes	as	obtained	at	the	1995,	1999	and	2003	
local	elections	(see	Appendix).	(5)	Dots	=	Bin	averages;	Bin	size	=	0.05	(40	bins);	optimal	bin	size	selected	using	a	standard	
F‐test	 for	nested	models	 (Lee	and	Lemieux,	2010).	 (6)	Black	 line	=	second‐order	polynomial,	 fitted	separately	on	either	
side	of	the	zero	threshold,	using	the	full	bandwidth.	(7)	Dashed	lines	=	95%	confidence	interval.	(8)	See	Table	A.1	in	the	
Appendix	for	definitions	and	sources.	
	
	
	
Figure	2:		Continuity	of	the	forcing	variable.	
a)	Histogram	 b)McCrary	test	
Notes:	 (1)	 Dots	 for	 the	McCrary	 graph:	 Bin	 averages	 of	 the	 density	 of	 forcing	 variable	 (Regional	 incumbent’s	 bloc	 vote	
margin).	(2)	Computed	with	McCrary’s	(2008)	Stata	program.		
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 Figure	3:		Capital	transfers	v.	Regional	incumbent’s	vote	margin.	
	
Notes:	 (1)	 Regional	 transfers	 =	 Capital	 transfers	 per	 capita	 from	 the	
Regional	to	the	Local	government	during	the	last	two	years	of	the	1995‐99,	
2000‐03,	 and	2004‐07	municipal	 terms.	 (2)	The	dots	 are	bin	averages	of	
5%	 bin	 size.	 (3)	 The	 solid	 line	 represents	 a	 second‐order	 polynomial	
regression.	(4)	The	dashed	lines	are	95%	confidence	intervals.		
	
	
	
Figure	4:		Continuity	of	the	Regional	Seat	Margin		
Notes:	(1)	The	dots	are	bin	averages	of	5%	bin	size.	(2)	The	solid	line	
represents	a	first‐order	polynomial	regression.	(3)	The	dashed	lines	
are	 95%	 confidence	 intervals.	 (4)	 The	 y‐axis	 plots	 the	 variable	
Regional	seat	margin,	which	is	the	difference	between	the	seat	shares	
of	the	parties	in	the	regional	government	and	those	of	the	parties	in	
the	 opposition	 in	 the	 last	 regional	 election	 (this	 variable	 is	
demeaned).			 	
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Figure	5:		Marginal	alignment	effect	
a) RDD	
		
b) DiD	
	
Notes:	(1)	Estimates	in	panel	a	correspond	to	column	1	in	Table	2	and	estimates	
in	 panel	b	 correspond	 to	 column	4	 in	 Table	 2.	 (2)	 The	 dashed	 lines	 are	 95%	
confidence	 intervals.	 (3)	 Regional	 Seat	Margin	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
regional	president’s	party	minus	the	seat	share	of	the	opposition	parties	in	the	
previous	state	election	(this	variable	is	demeaned).	
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A.I	Proofs	
Second‐order	condition:	
In	order	to	have	a	maximum	and	to	rule	out	corner	solutions,	we	need	the	second‐order	
condition	to	be	negative	in	all	cases:	
																			Λ௜ ൌ െ൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ൯ଶχ߶௥ሺݑᇱሺ߬௜ሻሻଶ െ ߟߠଷሺ2ܽ௜ െ 1ሻଷ߶௜ℓݑሺ߬௜ሻሺݑᇱሺ߬௜ሻሻଶ	
																																			൅൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ ൅ ߟߠሺ2ܽ௜ െ 1ሻ߶௜ℓ൯	ݑᇱᇱ െ ܿᇱᇱ ൏ 0													 																								(A.1)	
where	 	 χ ൌ ሺ̅ݒ௥,଴ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ∑ ݑሺ߬௜ሻ௜ ሻ/√ܰ.	 To	 obtain	 this	 expression	 we	 relied	 on	 the	
property	߲߶ሺݔሻ/߲ݔ	=െݔ. ߶ሺݔሻ	and	on	the	assumptions	ݑᇱᇱᇱ ൌ 0	and		ܿᇱᇱᇱ ൌ 0.			
This	SOC	can	be	evaluated	for	aligned	and	unaligned	municipalities:	
																									Λ௔ ൌ െ൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ൯ଶχ߶௥ሺݑᇱሺ߬௔ሻሻଶ െ ߟߠଷ߶௔ℓݑሺ߬௔ሻሺݑᇱሺ߬௔ሻሻଶ	
																																							൅൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ ൅ ߟߠ߶௔ℓ൯ݑᇱᇱ െ ܿᇱᇱ ൏ 0																																																											(A.2)	
																									Λ௨ ൌ െ൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ൯ଶχ߶௥ሺݑᇱሺ߬௨ሻሻଶ ൅ ߟߠଷ߶௨ℓݑሺ߬௨ሻሺݑᇱሺ߬௨ሻሻଶ	
																																			൅൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ െ ߟߠ߶௨ℓ൯ݑᇱᇱ െ ܿᇱᇱ ൏ 0																																																															(A.3)								
Note	that	all	the	expressions	in	Λ௔	are	negative.	However,	this	is	not	the	case	for	Λ௨;	in	this	
case	 the	expressions	ߟߠଷ߶௨ℓݑሺ߬௔ሻሺݑᇱሺ߬௔ሻሻଶ	 and	െߟߠ߶௨ℓݑᇱᇱ	 are	positive.	 So,	 for	 the	 second‐	
order	condition	to	hold	we	have	to	assume	that	these	expressions	are	smaller	in	absolute	
value	 to	 the	 others	 (i.e.,	 to		െ൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ൯ଶߢ߶௥ሺݑᇱሺ߬௨ሻሻଶ	 ൅ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ݑᇱᇱሻ.	 This	 amounts	 to	
assuming	that	the	incentives	working	through	local	elections	are	bounded	relative	to	those	
working	through	the	ones	working	through	regional	elections.		
Proof	of	Proposition	1:		
To	see	why	 there	 is	party	 favoritism	at	 close	 local	 elections,	we	have	 to	 compare	 the	net	
marginal	benefit	 for	an	aligned	(a)	and	an	unaligned	(u)	candidate	at	close	 local	elections	
(ݒ௜ℓ,଴ ൌ 0).	Operating	from	expression	(3)	in	the	main	text	we	obtain:	
										൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ ൅ ߟߠ߶௔ℓ൯ݑᇱሺ߬௔ሻ െ ܿᇱሺ߬௔ሻ ൌ ൫ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ െ ߟߠ߶௨ℓ൯ݑᇱሺ߬௨ሻ െ ܿᇱሺ߬௨ሻ								(A.4)								
Then:	
																							ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ െ ௖ᇲሺఛೌሻ௨ᇲሺఛೌሻ ൌ െߟߠ߶௔
ℓ				&					ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ሺ∙ሻ െ ௖ᇲሺఛೠሻ௨ᇲሺఛೠሻ ൌ ߟߠ߶௨
ℓ																(A.5)								
Given	 that	 ߟߠ߶௨ℓ 	൐ െߟߠ߶௔ℓ		 and	 ߢ ൌ ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥ ൐ 0,		this	 implies	 that	 ሺߢ െ ሺܿᇱሺ߬௨ሻ/
ݑ′ሺ߬௨ሻሻ ൐ ሺߢ െ ሺܿᇱሺ߬௔ሻ/ݑ′ሺ߬௔ሻሻ.	 Given	 that	 ܿᇱ/ݑᇱ		is	 monotonically	 increasing	 in	 ߬	 (since	
ݑᇱᇱ ൏ 0	and	ܿᇱᇱ ൐ 0ሻ,	this	condition	only	holds	if	߬௨ ൏ ߬௔,	which	is	the	case.	
Proof	of	Proposition	2:		
To	prove	 this	proposition	we	have	 to	 subtract	 the	partial	 derivative	of	 transfers	 ()	with	
respect	to	the	regional	margin	of	victory	(̅ݒ௥,଴)	for	an	unaligned	mayor	(ai=0)	from	that	of	
i
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an	 aligned	 mayor	 (ai=1),	 both	 evaluated	 at	 a	 zero	 local	 margin	 of	 victory	 (ݒ௜ℓ,଴ ൌ 0).	
Applying	the	implicit	function	theorem	on	the	FOC	we	obtain:	
											 ߲߬௔߲̅ݒ௥,଴ฬ௩೔ℓ,బୀ଴
െ ߲߬௨߲̅ݒ௥,଴ฬ௩೔ℓ,బୀ଴
ൌ െ ሺ߲Γ௔ሻ/ሺ߲̅ݒ
௥,଴	ሻ
Λ௔ ቤ௩೔బୀ଴
൅ ሺ߲Γ௨ሻ/ሺ߲̅ݒ
௥,଴	ሻ
Λ௨ ቤ௩೔బୀ଴
	
where		and		are	the	first	and	second	order	conditions,	respectively,	and	the	super‐scripts	
a	 and	 u	 indicate	 that	 they	 are	 evaluated	 for	 an	 aligned	 and	 an	 unaligned	 mayor.	 If	 this	
difference	 is	positive,	 less	competition	at	 the	regional	 level	 increases	 the	 level	of	partisan	
favoritism	 at	 close	 elections	 (the	 difference	 between	 the	 transfers	 to	 an	 aligned	 vs.	 an	
unaligned	 mayor	 when	 ݒ௜ℓ,଴ ൌ 0ሻ.	 To	 simplify,	 we	 omit	 below	 the	 reference	 to	 close	
elections.	Operating,	we	obtain:			
				 ߲߬௔߲̅ݒ௥,଴ െ
߲߬௨
߲̅ݒ௥,଴ ൌ െߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ
߲߶௥ሺ∙ሻ
߲̅ݒ௥,଴ ቆ
ݑᇱሺ߬௔ሻ
Λ௔ െ
ݑᇱሺ߬௨ሻ
Λ௨ ቇ	
where	Λ௔	and	 	Λ௨	denote	the	second‐order	condition	evaluated	at	close	local	elections	for	
the	aligned	and	unaligned	cases.	Since	߲߶௥ሺ∙ሻ/߲̅ݒ଴	<	0,	 for	this	expressions	to	be	positive,	
ݑᇱሺ߬௨ሻ/Λ௨	should	be	larger	than	ݑᇱሺ߬௔ሻ/Λ௔.		Given	that	ݑᇱሺ߬௨ሻ	>	ݑᇱሺ߬௔ሻ,	this	means	that	the	
above	condition	will	be	positive	if	Λ௨ െ Λ௔ ൐ 0.	Using	(A.2)	and	(A.3)	and	by	operating	we	
obtain:	
															Λ௨ െ Λ௔ ൌ െቀߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߯ߢ െ ߟ߶௨ℓߠଷݑሺ߬௨ሻቁ ሺݑᇱሺ߬௨ሻሻଶ	
																																							൅	ቀߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߯ߢ ൅ ߟ߶௔ℓߠଷݑሺ߬௔ሻቁ ሺݑᇱሺ߬௔ሻሻଶ െ ሺߟߠ߶௨ℓ+ߟߠ߶௔ℓሻ	ݑᇱᇱ										(A.6)	
where		χ ൌ ሺ̅ݒ௥,଴ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ∑ ݑሺ߬௜ሻ௜ ሻ/√ܰ	 and	 ߢ ൌ ߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߶௥.	If	 the	 second‐order	
conditions	for	the	unaligned	municipalities	(A.3ሻ		hold	then	it	follows	that:	
																								െ ቀߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߯ߢ െ ߟ߶௨ℓߠଷݑሺ߬௨ሻቁ ሺݑᇱሺ߬௨ሻሻଶ=൫ߟߠ߶௨ℓ െ ߢ൯ݑᇱᇱ ൅ ܿᇱᇱ ൅ ߜ																(A.7)	
where	ߜ	>0		is	a	constant.	Substituting	(A.7)	into	(A.6)	we	obtain		
				Λ௨ െ Λ௔ ൌ െ൫ߢ ൅ ߟߠ߶௔ℓ൯ݑᇱᇱ ൅ ܿᇱᇱ ൅ ߜ ൅ ቀߤሺ1 െ ߠሻ߯ߢ ൅ ߟߠଷ߶௔ℓݑሺ߬௔ሻቁ ሺݑᇱሺ߬௔ሻሻଶ ൐ 0					(A.8)	
This	expression	is	positive	because	all	terms	are	positive.	
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A.II	Data	and	variables.	
Table	A.1:	Main	variables:	definition,	descriptive	statistics	and	data	sources	
Variable	 Definition	 Mean(SD)	 Source	
Capital	transfers	
Capital	transfers	from	the	Regional	
government	per	capita	(item	7.5,	of	the	
revenue	budget)1	
99.82	
(142.84)	 Spanish	Ministry	of	Economics	
Alignment	(a)	
Dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	party	of	the	
mayor	is	the	same	as	that	of	the	
president	of	the	AC	(0	otherwise)	
0.62	
(0.48)	
Local	election	statistics	(votes	
and	seats	for	all	the	parties)	and	
partisan	identity	of	the	mayor,	
provided	by	the	Spanish	
Ministry	of	Interior	&	Ministry	of	
Public	Administration	(1995,	
2003	and	2007	local	elections)	
Vote	margin	computed	with	the	
same	data	using	an	algorithm	
developed	for	this	purpose	that	
replicates	the	workings	of	the	
d’Hondt	rule	(see	Table	A.2	in	
Appendix	A)	
Partner	alignment	
Dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	mayor	
and/or	the	main	partner	of	a	coalition	
belong	to	the	same	party	as	that	of	the	
president	of	the	AC	(o	otherwise)	
0.66	
(0.47)	
Bloc	alignment	
Dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	mayor	and	
the	regional	president	belong	to	the	
same	ideological	bloc	(0	otherwise)	
0.66	
(0.47)	
Regional	incumbent’s	
bloc	vote	margin		(v)	
%	of	votes	cast	at	the	local	elections	that	
have	to	be	added	(subtracted	from)	to	
the	ideological	bloc	of	the	Regional	
incumbent	to	win	(lose)	a	majority	of	
seats	in	the	local	council	
0.10	
(0.32)	
	
	
Regional	incumbent’s	
bloc	seat	majority	(d)	
Dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	incumbent’s	
bloc	vote	margin	at	the	local	elections	
(v)	is	greater	than	zero	(0	otherwise)	
0.61	
(0.49)	 	
Debt	burden	
	
Debt	burden	(capital,	item	9	of	the	
spending	budget,	+	interest,	item	3),	as	a	
share	of	current	revenues	
0.06	
(0.07)	
Spanish	Ministry	of	Economics	
(years	1996‐2007)	
Property	tax	rate	 Nominal	property	tax	rate	(IBI),	%	on	assessed	property	value	
0.59
(0.16)	
Centro	de	Gestión	Catastral	y	
Cooperación	Triburaria,	Spanish	
Ministry	of	Economics	(years	
1996‐2007)	Property	value	
Assessed	property	value (thousands	of	
EUR)	per	capita	
20.46
(21.74)	
Population	 Resident	population	 14291.55	(80809.51)	
Population	census	(1991,	2001)	
National	Institute	of	Statistics	
Censo	de	Habitantes	2001,	
National	Institute	of	Statistics		
%	Old	 %	resident	population	older	than	65	years	
0.16
(0.05)	
%	Young	 %	resident	population	younger	than	14	years	
0.21
(0.04)	
%	Immigrant	 %	resident	population	non‐EU	immigrant	
0.01
(0.03)	
%	Unemployed	 %	resident	population	unemployed	 0.06	(0.03)	
Income	indicator	
Residents’	income	level,	as	estimated	
from	objective	indicators	(e.g.,	cars,	
bank	deposits,	etc.)	
0.94	
(0.14)	 Anuario	Económico	de	España,	
La	Caixa	(years	1996‐2007)	
Population	density	 Population	per	square	kilometer	 361.42	(1,306.37)	
Notes:	 1.	 In	 order	 to	 facilitate	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 treatment	 effects	 presented	 in	 this	 paper,	 the	 descriptive	
statistics	of	“Capital	transfers”	refer	to	unaligned	municipalities	while	those	of	the	rest	of	variables	refer	to	the	whole	
sample.	
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Table	A.2:	Interaction	variables:	definition,	descriptive	statistics	and	data	sources	
Variable	 Definition	 Mean(SD)	 Source	
Local	party	
Dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	party	of	the	
mayor	cannot	be	classified	as	left	or	
right	wing	
0.017	
(0.13)	
Local	election	statistics	(votes	
and	seats	for	all	the	parties)	and	
partisan	identity	of	the	mayor,	
provided	by	the	Spanish	
Ministry	of	Interior	&	Ministry	of	
Public	Administration.	
Concurrent	elections	 Dummy	equal	to	one	if	regional	and	local	elections	are	held	on	the	same	day	
0.56
(0.49)	 ‐‐.‐‐	
Single	province	 Dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	region	has	only	one	province	
0.12
(0.32)	 ‐‐.‐‐	
Regional	revenues	pc	 Current	revenues	per	capita	in	each	region.	This	variable	is	demeaned.	
0.00
(702.68)	
Spanish	Ministry	of	Economics	
(years	1996‐2007)	Regional	debt	
Debt	burden	(capital,	item	9	of	the	
spending	budget,	+	interest,	item	3)		as	a	
share	of	current	revenues.	This	variable	
is	demeaned.	
0.00	
(3.61)	
Municipal	density	
Average	population	density	(population	
per	square	kilometer)	of	the	
municipalities	in	each	region.	This	
variable	is	demeaned.		
0.00	
(138.60)	 Population	census	(1991,	2001)	National	Institute	of	Statistics	
Censo	de	Habitantes	2001,	
National	Institute	of	Statistics	%	Educated	
Percentage	of	people	with	primary	and	
secondary	education.	This	variable	is	
demeaned.	
0.00	
(0.09)	
Press	circulation	
Newspaper	copies	(at	the	province	
level)	per	1000	inhabitants.	This	
variable	is	demeaned.	
0.00	
	(25.90)	
Oficina	de	Justificación	de	la	
Difusión	(Circulation	Audit	
Bureau)	
www.introl.com		
Tenure	in	office	
Number	of	consecutive	terms	(including	
the	current	one)	that	a	party	has	been	in	
office.	This	variable	is	demeaned.		
0.00	
(2.03)	
Regional	election	statistics	
obtained	from	web	source	
(http://www.	datos	
elecciones.com/parlamentos‐
autonomicos	
Regional	seat	margin	
	
	
	
Difference	between	the	seat	share	of	the	
parties	in	the	regional	government	and	
the	seat	share	of	the	main	opposition	
parties	in	the	previous	regional	election.	
This	variable	is	demeaned.	
0.00	
(7.44)	
Difference	between	the	seat	share	of	the	
ideological	bloc	of	the	regional	
government	and	the	seat	share	of	
opposition’s	ideological	bloc	in	the	
previous	regional	election.	This	variable	
is	demeaned.	
0.00	
(9.67)	
Difference	between	the	seat	share	of	the	
main	party	in	the	regional	government	
and	the	seat	share	of	the	main	
opposition	party	in	the	previous	
regional	election.	This	variable	is	
demeaned.	
0.00	
(11.37)	
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Table	A.3:	Calculation	of	the	forcing	variable		
Explanation:	
The	 forcing	variable	 for	our	RDD	 is	 the	Regional	 incumbent’s	bloc	vote	margin,	 computed	as	 the	 ratio	
between	 the	minimum	number	 of	 votes	needed	 for	 the	 ideological	 bloc	 of	 the	 regional	 incumbent	 to	
gain/lose	 the	majority	 of	 seats	 in	 the	 local	 council	 and	 the	 total	 votes	 cast	 at	 the	 local	 elections.	 The	
computation	 of	 this	 measure	 is	 not	 straightforward	 and	 requires	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 specific	
allocation	system	used	to	assign	votes	to	seats,	 in	this	case	the	d’Hondt	rule.	Under	this	rule	the	votes	
for	each	party	are	divided	by	1,	2,	3,	4,	…,	N,	where	N	is	the	number	of	seats	to	be	assigned.	The	resulting	
quotas	or	comparison	numbers	are	ranked	and	N	seats	are	allocated	using	this	ranking.		
								We	have	developed	an	algebraic	procedure	to	compute	the	Regional	 incumbent’s	bloc	vote	margin	
for	 each	 municipality	 in	 the	 sample1.	 Our	 procedure	 works	 by	 subtracting	 votes	 from	 the	 regional	
president’s	 ideological	 bloc	 if	 it	 holds	 a	majority	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 or	 adding	 votes	 if	 it	 does	not.	We	
make	some	initial	assumptions	regarding	the	migration	of	these	votes.	First,	we	assume	that	these	votes	
either	i)	go	to	(come	from)	the	abstention	or	ii)	go	to	(come	from)	both	the	abstention	and	the	parties	in	
the	opposition	bloc.	The	formulation	we	present	here	is	for	the	first	approach	and	the	formula	used	in	
the	second	approach	and	the	Stata	code	are	available	upon	request.	Second,	we	assume	that	the	votes	
lost	by	(added	to)	the	regional	incumbent’s	bloc	are	allocated	between	the	parties	belonging	to	this	bloc	
in	proportion	to	their	 initial	vote	share.	Below	we	present	 the	 formulation	used	for	the	close	election	
cases	–i.e.,	the	seat	margin	is	–1	or	+1.	Derivations	for	non‐close	elections	are	available	upon	request2.	
Notation	and	definitions:	
ߥூ௜	&	ߥை௞:	votes	for	parties	i	and	k,	from	the	regional	incumbent’s	(I)	and	opposition’s	(O)	blocs.	
ߙூ௜	&	ߙை௞:	votes	for	parties	i	and	k	as	a	proportion	of	the	votes	for	the	bloc	they	belong	to.		
ݏூ௜	&	ݏை௞:	seats	for	parties	i	and	k.	
ܿூ௜ሺݏூ௜ሻ ൌ ߥூ௜/ݏூ௜	:	comparison	number	for	the	last	seat	won	by	party	i.	
ܿூ௜ሺݏூ௜ ൅ 1ሻ ൌ ߥூ௜/ሺݏூ௜ ൅ 1ሻ:	comparison	number	for	the	next	seat	to	be	won	by	party	i.	
ܿூ௠௜௡ሺݏூሻ ൌ ݉݅݊௜ሺܿூ௜൫ݏூ௜൯ሻ:		smallest	comparison	number	for	the	last	seat	won	by	a	party	in	I.		
ܿூ௠௔௫ሺݏூ ൅ 1ሻ ൌ ݉݅݊௜ሺܿூ௜ሺݏூ௜ ൅ 1ሻሻ:	largest	comparison	number	for	the	next	seat	to	be	won	by	a	party	in	I.	
ܿை௞ሺݏை௞ሻ,	ܿை௞ሺݏை௞ ൅ 1ሻ,	ܿை௠௜௡ሺݏைሻ	and	ܿை௠௔௫ሺݏை ൅ 1ሻ:	comparison	numbers	for	the	opposition’s	bloc.	
Formulation:	
If	the	regional	incumbents’s	bloc	holds	a	majority	in	the	council	and,	so,	a	party	from	the	opposition	bloc	
has	to	win	a	seat,	 its	comparison	number	 for	the	next	seat	to	be	gained,	ܿை௠௔௫ሺݏை ൅ 1ሻ,	must	be	 larger	than	 the	 comparison	number	 for	 the	 last	 seat	distributed	 to	a	party	 in	 the	 regional	 incumbent’s	bloc,	
once	߭	votes	are	subtracted	from	that	bloc.	The	condition	for	party	z	in	the	opposition	gaining	a	seat	is:	
																																																																				ܿூ௠௜௡∗ሺݏூሻ ൏ ܿை௠௔௫ሺݏை ൅ 1ሻ																																																																												[A.i]	where	 ܿூ௠௜௡∗ሺݏூሻ	 is	 the	 smallest	 comparison	number	 for	 the	 last	 seat	originally	 gained	by	a	party,	 say	
party	x,	among	the	parties	from	the	regional	incumbent’s	bloc	once			votes	have	been	subtracted.	z	is	
the	party	that	has	the	highest	comparison	number	for	the	next	seat	to	be	gained	among	all	the	parties	of	
the	opposition	bloc.	Expression	 [A.i]	 can	be	 rewritten	as	ߥூ௫ െ ߭௫/ݏூ௫ ൏ ߥை௫/ሺݏை௫ ൅ 1ሻ,	where	߭௫	are	 the	votes	subtracted	from	party	x.3	Under	the	assumption	that	all	the	parties	from	the	regional	incumbent’s	
bloc	lose	votes	according	to	the	votes	originally	cast,	expression	[A.i]	determines	that	the	total	amount	
of	votes	that	the	regional	incumbent’s	bloc	has	to	lose	to	lose	one	seat	is	equal	to:	
																														߭ ൌ ሺ߭௫/ߙூ௫ሻ ൅ 1							where							߭௫ ൌ ሺܿூ௠௜௡ሺݏூሻ െ ܿை௠௔௫ሺݏை ൅ 1ሻሻ	ݏூ௫																																				[A.ii]	
If	the	regional	incumbent’s	ideological	bloc	is	in	a	minority	in	the	local	council,	the	votes	to	be	added	to	
the	opposition	bloc	for	a	party,	say	part	y,	in	this	bloc	to	gain	a	seat	are	such	that:	
																																																																								ܿை௠௜௡ሺݏைሻ	<	ܿூ௠௔௫∗ሺݏூ ൅ 1ሻ																																																																							[A.iii]	
where		ܿூ௠௔௫∗ሺݏூ ൅ 1ሻ	is	the	largest	comparison	number	for	the	next	seat	to	be	gained	by	party	y	from	the	
regional	incumbent’s	bloc,	once	 	votes	are	added	to	the	opposition	bloc.	Party	y	is	the	one	that	has	the	
highest	comparison	number	for	the	next	seat	to	be	gained.	Expression	[A.iii]	can	be	re‐written	as:	
																																		ߜ ൌ ሺߜ௬/ߙூ௬ሻ ൅ 1							where			ߜ௬ ൌ ቀܿை௠௜௡ሺݏைሻ െ ܿூ௠௔௫ሺݏூ ൅ 1ሻቁ ൫ݏூ௬ ൅ 1൯																						[A.iv]	Notes:		(1)	When	the	seat	margin	is	larger	than	one,	the	procedure	is	iterated	until	there	is	a	switch	in	the	bloc	holding	
the	majority.	Then,	the	final	measure	is	an	aggregation	of	votes	needed	to	lose	(win)	all	these	seats.	(2)	Party	x	is	such	
δ
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that	 equation	 [A.i]	 and	minM(viM	 ‐	vi)/siM	 holds.	 Party	x	will	 typically	 be	 the	 party	 that	won	 the	 last	 seat.	 If	 there	 is	
another	party	with	a	larger	vote	share	that	won	a	seat	(but	not	the	last	one)	this	party	should	be	the	one	considered.
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Table	A.4:	Numerical	example	
	 Opposition	bloc	 Bloc	in	power	
	 Party	1	 Party	2	 Party	3	 Party	4	
Votes	of	party	x	 95 957 247 1333	
Vote	share	of	party	x	 0.04 0.36 0.09 0.51	
Seats	of	party	x	 0 5 1 7	
1	 95.00 957.00 247.00 1333.00	
2	 47.50 478.50 123.50 666.50	
3	 31.67 319.00 82.33 444.33	
4	 23.75 239.25 61.75 333.25	
5	 19.00 191.40 49.40 266.60	
6	 15.83 159.50 41.17 222.17	
7	 13.57 136.71 35.29 190.43	
8	 11.88 119.63 30.88 166.63	
9	 10.56 106.33 27.44 148.11	
10	 9.50 95.70 24.70 133.30	
11	 8.64 87.00 22.45 121.18	
12	 7.92 79.75 20.58 111.08	
13	 7.31 73.62 19.00 102.54	
Note: In this municipality there are 13 seats to be allocated amongst 4 parties. Figures in 
columns 3-5 are the so-called ‘comparison numbers’. The value 47.50 in column 2 is 
obtained by dividing the total number of seats of party 1 (95) by the seat number (2). 
Cells highlighted in grey represent the number of seats held by each party.  
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Table	A.5:	Example	of	how	the	Regional	Incumbent’s	bloc	vote	margin	is	computed	(votes	lost	by	the	bloc	in	power	go	to	electoral	abstention) 
	
Stage	1:		
Initial	seat	allocation	
Stage	2:		
Seat	allocation	once	1	votes	have	been	
subtracted	to	the	bloc	in	power		
Stage	3:		
Seat	allocation	once	1	+	2	votes	have	been	
subtracted	to	the	bloc	in	power	
	 Opposition	bloc	 Bloc	in	power	 Opposition	bloc	 Bloc	in	power	 Opposition	bloc	 Bloc	in	power	
	 P1	 P2	 P3	 P4	 P1	 P2	 P3	 P4	 P1	 P2	 P3	 P4	
vi	 95	 957	 247 1333 95 957 207	 1116 95 957 152 820
vi/V	 0.04	 0.36	 0.09 0.51 0.04 0.40 0.09	 0.47 0.05 0.47 0.08 0.41
si	 0	 5	 1 7 0 6 1	 6 0 7 1 5
αi	 	 	 0.16 0.84 	 	 0.16	 0.84 	 	
1 95.00	 957.00	 247.00 1333.00 95.00 957.00 207.00	 1116.00 95.00 957.00 152.00 820.00
2 47.50	 478.50	 123.50 666.50 47.50 478.50 103.50	 558.00 47.50 478.50 76.00 410.00
3 31.67	 319.00	 82.33 444.33 31.67 319.00 69.00	 372.00 31.67 319.00 50.67 273.33
4 23.75	 239.25	 61.75 333.25 23.75 239.25 51.75	 279.00 23.75 239.25 38.00 205.00
5 19.00	 191.40	 49.40 266.60 19.00 191.40 41.40	 223.20 19.00 191.40 30.40 164.00
6 15.83	 159.50	 41.17 222.17 15.83 159.50 34.50	 186.00 15.83 159.50 25.33 136.67
7 13.57	 136.71	 35.29 190.43 13.57 136.71 29.57	 159.43 13.57 136.71 21.71 117.14
8 11.88	 119.63	 30.88 166.63 11.88 119.63 25.88	 139.50 11.88 119.63 19.00 102.50
9 10.56	 106.33	 27.44 148.11 10.56 106.33 23.00	 124.00 10.56 106.33 16.89 91.11
10 9.50	 95.70	 24.70 133.30 9.50 95.70 20.70	 111.60 9.50 95.70 15.20 82.00
11 8.64	 87.00	 22.45 121.18 8.64 87.00 18.82	 101.45 8.64 87.00 13.82 74.55
12 7.92	 79.75	 20.58 111.08 7.92 79.75 17.25	 93.00 7.92 79.75 12.67 68.33
13 7.31	 73.62	 19.00 102.54 7.31 73.62 15.92	 85.85 7.31 73.62 11.69 63.08
distance	 	 	 257.62 	 	 	 350.56	 		 	 	 	 	
δi	 	 	 40 217 	 	 55	 296 	 	 	 	
Δ	 	 	 δ1=257 		 	 	 δ2=351	 		 	 	 	 	
Note:	For	example,	the	distance	to	lose	the	last	seat	is	computed	as	257.62=[(190.43‐159.5)·7/0.51]+1	
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Table	A.6:	Example	of	how	the	Regional	Incumbent’s	bloc	vote	margin	is	computed	(votes	lost	go	to	abstention	and	to	the	opposition	bloc).	
						
Stage	1:		
Initial	seat	allocation	
Stage	2:		
Seat	allocation	once	1	votes	have	been	
subtracted	to	the	bloc	in	power		
Stage	3:		
Seat	allocation	once	1	+	2	votes	have	been	
subtracted	to	the	bloc	in	power	
	 Opposition	bloc	 Bloc	in	power	 Opposition	bloc	 Opposition	bloc	 Bloc	in	power	 Bloc	in	power	
	 P1	 P2	 P3	 P4	 P1	 P2	 P3	 P4	 P1	 P2	 P3	 P4	
vi	 95	 957 247 1333 102 1028 222 1198 113 1144 181 979
vi/V	 0.04	 0.36 0.09 0,51 0.04 0.39 0.09 0.49 0.04 0.42 0.08 0.45
si	 0	 5 1 7 0 6 1 6 0 7 1 5
αi	 0.09	 0.91 0.16 0.84 0.09 0.91 0.16 0.84 	 	
abstention	 1096	
φO	 0.49	
1 95.00	 957.00 247.00 1333.00 102.00 1028.00 222.00 1198.00 113.00 1144.00 181.00 979.00
2 47.50	 478.50 123.50 666.50 47.50 514.00 111.00 599.00 56.50 572.00 90.50 489.50
3 31.67	 319.00 82.33 444.33 31.67 342.67 74.00 399.33 37.67 381.33 60.33 326.33
4 23.75	 239.25 61.75 333.25 23.75 257.00 55.50 299.50 28.25 286.00 45.25 244.75
5 19.00	 191.40 49.40 266.60 19.00 205.60 44.40 239.60 22.60 228.80 36.20 195.80
6 15.83	 159.50 41.17 222.17 15.83 171.33 37.00 199.67 18.83 190.67 30.17 163.17
7 13.57	 136.71 35.29 190.43 13.57 146.86 31.71 171.14 16.14 163.43 25.86 139.86
8 11.88	 119.63 30.88 166.63 11.88 128.50 27.75 149.75 14.13 143.00 22.63 122.38
9 10.56	 106.33 27.44 148.11 10.56 114.22 24.67 133.11 12.56 127.11 20.11 108.78
10 9.50	 95.70 24.70 133.30 9.50 102.80 22.20 119.80 11.30 114.40 18.10 97.90
11 8.64	 87.00 22.45 121.18 8.64 93.45 20.18 108.91 10.27 104.00 16.45 89.00
12 7.92	 79.75 20.58 111.08 7.92 85.67 18.50 99.83 9.42 95.33 15.08 81.58
13 7.31	 73.62 19.00 102.54 7.31 79.08 17.08 92.15 8.69 88.00 13.92 75.31
Distance	 	 	 159.79 	 	 	 259.54 		 	 	 	 	
δi	 	 	 25 135 	 	 41 219 	 	 	 	
δ	 	 	 δ 1=160 	 	 	 δ	2=260 	 	 	 	 	
μi	 7	 71	 	 	 11	 116	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Note:	For	example,	the	distance	to	lose	the	last	seat	is	computed	as	159.79=[(190.43‐159.5)·7/0.84]·[1/(1+(7/(5+1))·(0.91/0.84)·0.49)]+1;	μi	
are	the	votes	transferred	to	the	opposition	block	( ).	
	 	
O
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Table	A.7:	Calculation	of	Regional	Electoral	Competition	proxies	
	
Period	 (i)		President’s	Coalition	
(ii)	
Opposition’s	Coalition	
(iii)	
Other	parties	in	
President’s	bloc	
(iv)		
Other	parties	in	
Opposition’s	
bloc	
(v)		
Not	
Classified	
Regional	seat	margin
(vi)	
President’s	v.	
Opposition’s	
coalition	
(vii)	
President’s	v.	
Opposition’s	
bloc	
(viii)	
Main	two	
parties	
Andalucía 1998‐99 PSOE	(52),	PA	(4)	 PP (40) IU (13) 	 16/109=0.147 29/109=0.266 12/109=0.110	
	 2002‐03	 PSOE	(52),	PA	(5)		 PP	(46)	 IU	(6)	 	 	 11/109=0.101	 17/109=0.156	 6/109=0.055	
	 2006‐07	 PSOE	(61)	 PP	(37)	 IU	(6),	PA	(5)	 	 	 24/109=0.220	 35/109=0.321	 24/109=0.220
Aragon	 1998‐99	 PP	(27),	PAR	(14)	 PSOE	(19),	IU	(5),	CHA	(2)	 	 	 	 15/67=0.223	 15/67=0.223	 8/67=0.119	
	 2002‐03 PSOE	(23),	PAR	(10),	IU (1) PP (28) CHA (5) 	 6/67=0.089 11/67=0.164 ‐5/67=‐0.074	
	 2006‐07 PSOE	(27),	PAR	(8) PP (22) IU (1),	CHA (9) 	 13/67=0.194 23/67=0.343 5/67=0.074	
Asturias 1998‐99 PP	(21)	 PSOE	(17) IU	(6),	PAS (1) 4/45=0.089 ‐3/45=‐0.067 4/45=0.089	
	 2002‐03	 PSOE	(24),	IU	(3)		 PP	(15)	 	 	 URAS	(3)	 12/45=0.267	 12/45=0.267	 9/45=0.200	
	 2006‐07	 PSOE	(22),	IU	(4)	 PP	(19)	 	 	 	 7/45=0.156	 7/45=0.156	 3/45=0.067	
Baleares	 1998‐99	 PP	(30)	 PSOE	(16),	PSM‐IU‐EV	(10)	 AIPF	(1)	 	 UM	(2)	 4/59=0.068	 5/59=0.084	 14/59=0.237	
	 2002‐03
	
PSOE	(13),	PACTE‐PSM
‐EUEV‐COP	(15),	UM	(3)	
PP (28) 	 3/59=0.051 3/59=0.051 ‐13/59=‐0.220	
	 2006‐07	 PP	(29),	UM	(3)	 PSOE	(15),	PACTE‐	
PSM‐EUEV	(11)	
AIPF	(1)	 	 	 6/59=0.102	 7/59=0.119	 14/59=0.237	
Canarias 1998‐99 CC	(21),	PP	(18)	 PSOE (16) AHI (1) 	 PCN (4) 23/60=0.383 24/60=0.4 5/60=0.083	
	 2002‐03	 CC	(24),	PP	(15)	 PSOE	(19)	 AHI	(2)	 	 	 20/60=0.333	 22/60=0.367	 5/60=0.083	
	 2006‐07	 CC	(23),	PP	(17)	 PSOE	(17)	 	 	 FNC	(3)	 23/60=0.383	 23/60=0.383	 6/60=0.1	
Cantabria	 1998‐99	 PP	(13),	PRC	(6),	UPCA	(7)	 PSOE	(10),	IU	(3)	 	 	 	 13/39=0.333	 13/39=0.333	 3/39=0.077	
	 2002‐03 PP	(19),	PRC	(6)	 PSOE (14) 	 11/39=0.282 11/39=0.282 5/39=0.128	
	 2006‐07 PSOE	(13),	PRC	(8) PP (18) 	 3/39=0.077 3/39=0.077 ‐5/39=‐0.128	
Notes:	(1)	Party	acronyms	in	capital	letters	(see	Table	A.8	for	an	explanation).	(2)	In	red:	Left‐wing	parties;	In	blue:	right‐wing	parties;	In	green:	Parties	not	classified	(either	
because	their	ideology	is	ambiguous	or	because	they	have	also	been	supporting,	or	are	expected	to	support,	both	right‐	or	left‐wing	presidents;	Underlined:	regionally	based	
parties.	 (3)	 In	 parentheses:	 number	 of	 seats	 held	 by	 the	 party.	 (4)	 (i)	 President’s	 coalition:	 parties	 supporting	 the	 regional	 president	 in	 the	 parliament;	 (ii)	 Opposition’s	
coalition:	parties	belonging	to	a	different	ideological	bloc	to	that	of	the	regional	president	and	that	support,	with	a	high	degree	of	likelihood,	the	second	party’s	candidate;	(iii)	
Other	parties	in	the	President’s	bloc:	rest	of	the	parties	belonging	to	the	same	ideological	bloc	as	that	of	the	president;	(iv)	Other	parties	in	the	Opposition’s	bloc:	rest	of	the	
parties	belonging	to	a	different	ideological	bloc	to	that	of	the	president;	(v)	Not	classified:	regional	parties	not	belonging	to	the	president’s	coalition	but	that	cannot	be	classified	
in	one	of	the	two	ideological	blocs,	either	because	their	ideology	is	ambiguous,	or	because	they	entered	coalitions	with	parties	in	both	blocs	in	different	elections,	or	because	of	
specific	issues	that	impede	them	entering	into	coalition	agreements	with	some	or	all	of	the	parties	(e.g.,	conflictive	scissions	from	other	parties,	parties	with	extreme	positions	
on	other	issues	as	e.g.,	secessionism).	(5)	(vi)	President’s	v.	Opposition’s	coalition:	seats	of	the	President’s	coalition	(sum	of	the	seats	of	the	parties	in	column	(i))	less	seats	of	the	
Opposition’s	coalition	(sum	of	the	seats	of	the	parties	in	column	(ii)	)	divided	by	the	total	number	of	seats	in	the	regional	parliament	(vii)	President’s	v.	Opposition’s	bloc:	seats	of	
the	presidents’	coalition	(i)	+	seats	of	other	parties	 in	her	bloc	(iii)	 less	seats	 in	the	oppositions’	coalition	 	(ii)	+	seats	of	other	parties	in	that	bloc	 	(iv),	divided	by	the	total	
number	of	seats;	(viii)	Two	main	parties:	difference	between	the	seats	of	the	most	voted	party	in	(i)	and	the	most	voted	party	in	(ii),	divided	by	the	total	number	of	seats.	
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Table	A.7	(continued)	
	
Period	 (i)		President’s	Coalition	
(ii)	
Opposition’s	Coalition	
(iii)	
Other	
parties	in	
President’s	
bloc	
(iv)		
Other	parties	
in	
Opposition’s	
bloc	
(v)		
Not	
Classified	
Regional	seat margin
(vi)	
President’s	v.	
Opposition’s	
coalition	
(vii)	
President’s	v.	
Opposition’s	
bloc	
(viii)	
Main	two	
parties	
Castilla‐La	
Mancha	
1998‐99	 PSOE	(24)	 PP	(22)	 IU	(1)	 	 	 2/47=0.042	 3/47=0.063	 2/47=0.042	
2002‐03	 PSOE	(26)	 PP (21) 5/47=0.106 5/47=0.106 5/47=0.106
2006‐07	 PSOE	(29)	 PP (18) 11/47=0.234 11/47=0.234 11/47=0.234
Castilla‐León 1998‐99	 PP	(50)	 PSOE (27),	IU (5) UPL (2) 18/84=0.214 18/84=0.214 23/84=0.274
2002‐03	 PP	(48)	 PSOE	(30),	IU	(1)	 	 TC	(1)	 UPL	(3)	 17/83=0.205	 16/83=0.193	 18/83=0.217	
	 2006‐07	 PP	(48)	 PSOE	(32)	 	 	 UPL	(2)	 16/82=0.195	 16/82=0.195	 16/82=0.195	
Catalunya	 1998‐99	 CiU	(60)	 PSOE	(34),	IU	(11)		 PP	(17)	 ERC	(13)	 	 15/135=0.111	 19/135=0.141	 26/135=0.192	
	 2002‐03	 CiU	(56),	PP	(12) PSOE (52),	IU (3)	 ERC (12)	 13/135=0.096 1/135=0.007 4/135=0.029
	 2006‐07	 PSOE	(42),	IU (9),	ERC (23) CiU (46),	PP (15) 13/135=0.096 13/135=0.096 ‐4/135=‐0.030
Extremadura 1998‐99	 PSOE	(31)	 PP (27) IU (6) CE (1) 4/65=0.061 10/65=0.153 	4/65=0.061
	 2002‐03	 PSOE	(34)	 PP	(28)	 IU	(3)	 	 	 6/65=0.092	 9/65=0.138	 6/65=0.092	
	 2006‐07	 PSOE	(36)	 PP	(26)	 IU	(3)	 	 	 10/65=0.154	 13/65=0.200	 10/65=0.154	
Galicia	 1998‐99	 PP	(42)	 PSOE	(18),	BNG	(15)	 	 	 	 9/75=0.12	 9/75=0.12	 24/75=0.320	
	 2002‐03	 PP	(41)	 PSOE (17),	BNG (17) 7/75=0.093 7/75=0.093 24/75=0.320
	 2006‐07	 PSOE	(25),	BNG (13) PP (37) 1/75=0.013 1/75=0.013 ‐12/75=‐0.16
Madrid 1998‐99	 PP	(54)	 PSOE (32),	IU (17) 5/103=0.048 5/103=0.048 22/103=0.213
	 2002‐03	 PP	(55)	 PSOE	(39),	IU	(8)	 	 	 	 8/102=0.078	 8/102=0.078	 16/102=0.157	
	 2006‐07	 PP	(57)	 PSOE	(45),	IU	(9)	 	 	 	 3/111=0.027	 3/111=0.027	 12/111=0.108	
Murcia	 1998‐99	 PP	(26)	 PSOE	(15),	IU	(4)	 	 	 	 7/45=0.155	 7/45=0.155	 11/45=0.244	
	 2002‐03	 PP	(26)	 PSOE (18),	IU (1) 7/45=0.155 7/45=0.155 8/45=0.178
	 2006‐07	 PP	(28)	 PSOE (16),	IU	(1) 11/45=0.244 11/45=0.244 12/45=0.267
Rioja	(La) 1998‐99	 PP	(17)	 PSOE (12),	IU (2) PR (2) 3/33=0.091 5/33=0.151 5/33=0.151
	 2002‐03	 PP	(18)	 PSOE	(13)	 PR	(2)	 	 	 5/33=0.151	 7/33=0.212	 5/33=0.151	
	 2006‐07	 PP	(17)	 PSOE	(14)	 PR	(2)	 	 	 3/33=0.091	 5/33=0.151	 3/33=0.091	
Valencia	 1998‐99	 PP	(42),	UV	(5)	 PSOE	(32),	IU	(10)	 	 	 	 5/89=0.056	 5/89=0.056	 10/89=0.112	
	 2002‐03	 PP	(49)	 PSOE (35),	IU (5) 9/89=0.101 9/89=0.101 14/89=0.157
	 2006‐07	 PP	(48)	 PSOE (35),	IU (6) 7/89=0.079 7/89=0.079 13/89=0.146
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Table	A.8:	Political	parties	
Acronym	
	
Party	Name	 Ideology Representation	in	the	sample
%	Regional	
presidents	
%	Regional	seats
PSOE	 Partido	Socialista	
Obrero	Español	
Socialism 17/45=38% 1193/3169=37.66%
PA		 Partido	Andalucista	 Nationalism,	progressiveness 0% 14/3169=0.44%
PP	 Partido	Popular	
(People’s	Party)	
Conservative	liberalism 23/45=51% 1331/3169=42.32%
IU	 Izquierda	Unida	 Former	Communist	Party 0% 153/3169=4.83%
PAR	 Partido	Aragonés	
Regionalista	
Nationalism,	center 0% 32/3169=1.01%
CHA	 Chunta	Aragonesista	 Republicanism,	nationalism
socialdemocracy		
0% 16/3169=0.50%
URAS		 Unión	Renovadora	
Asturiana	
Regionalism,	conservatism 0% 3/3169=0.09%
PAS			 Partíu	Asturianista	 Nationalism,	social democracy 0% 1/3169=0.03%
PSM‐IU‐EV			 Partit	Socialista	de	
Mallorca	/Menorca	–	
Esquerra	Unida		
Coalition	between	the	socialist	
party	in	Mallorca	and	Menorca	
and	the	former	communist	party	
0% 10/3169=0.32%
PACTE‐PSM	
‐EUEV‐COP		
	
Pacte	Progressista	–	
Partit	Socialista	de	
Mallorca/Menorca	–	
Esquerra	Unida		
Coalition	between	the	socialist	
party	in	Mallorca	and	Menorca	
and	several	left‐wing	parties	
0% 26/3169=0.82%
UM			 Unió	Mallorquina	 Liberalism,	regionalism,	center‐
right	
0% 8/3169=0.25%
AIPF				 Agrupació	Independent	
Popular	de	Formentera	
Conservatism,	center‐right 0% 2/3169=0.06%
CC				 Coalición	Canaria	 Nationalism,	conservatism	 3/45=	7% 68/3169=2.15%
AHI			 Agrupación	Herreña	
Independiente	
Nationalism,	close	to	Coalición	
Canaria	with	whom	they	ran	
jointly	in	some	elections		
0% 3/3169=0.09%
PNC			 Partido	Nacionalista	
Canario	
Nationalism 0% 4/3169=0.13%
FNC				 Federación	
Nacionalista	Canaria	
Nationalism 0% 3/3169=0.09%
PRC			 Partido	Regionalista	de	
Cantabria	
Regionalism,	social democracy 0% 20/3169=0.63%
UPCA			 Unión	para	el	Progreso	
de	Cantabria	
Regionalism.	Founded	by	former	
People’s	Party’s	deputies		
0% 7/3169=0.22%
TC			 Tierra	Comunera	 Nationalism,	environmentalism, 
progressiveness	
0%	 1/3169=0.03%	
UPL			 Unión	del	Pueblo	
Leonés	
Regionalism 0% 7/3169=0.22%
CiU		 Convergència	i	Unió	 Nationalism,	liberalism,	Christian	
Democrats	
2/45	=	4% 162/3169=5.11%
ERC				 Esquerra	Republicana	
de	Catalunya	
Republicanism,	secessionism 0% 48/3169=1.51%
CE		 Coalición	Extremeña	 Regionalism,	social democracy 0% 1/3169=0.03%
BNG			 Bloque	Nacionalista	
Galego	
Nationalism,	socialism 0% 45/3169=1.42%
PR			 Partido	Riojano	 Progressiveness,	regionalism 0% 6/3169=0.19%
UV				 Unión	Valenciana	 Regionalism,	conservatism 0% 5/3169=0.16%
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A.III	Additional	Tables	and	Figures	
	
Table	A.9:	DiD	placebo	test.		
	 (i)	 (ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	
	 DiD	 DiD	 DiD	 DiD	
a	 69.84 70.08 53.17 58.71	
	 (6.67)***	 (6.64)***	 (5.77)***	 (6.22)***	
at+1	 ‐4.77 ‐4.85 ‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐	
	 (‐0.96)	 (‐0.95)	 	 	
at‐1	 ‐‐.‐‐ ‐‐.‐‐ ‐4.05 ‐7.50	
	 	 	 (‐0.28)	 (‐0.51)	
R2	 0.23 0.23 0.08 0.10	
Terms	 1st	&	2nd	 1st	&	2nd	 2nd	&	3rd	 2nd	&	3rd	
Controls	 NO YES NO YES	
Observations	 3,462	 3,462	 3,462	 3,462	
Notes:	(1)	1st	term	refers	to	years	1995‐99,	2nd	to	2000‐03,	and	3rd	to	2004‐07.	(2)	The	dependent	
variable	is	capital	transfers	per	capita	granted	to	municipality	 i	over	the	two	years	prior	to	local	
elections.	(3)	All	coefficients	are	difference‐in‐differences	estimates.	(4)	Explanatory	variable:	a=	
alignment	 dummy,	 at+1=	 lead	 alignment	 dummy,	 and	 at‐1=	 lag	 alignment	 dummy.	 (5)	 Control	
variables	are	the	same	as	in	Table	1.	(8)	Municipality	and	time	effects	included	in	all	columns.	(8)	
t‐statistic	 in	 parentheses,	 robust	 standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	municipality	 level;	 ***,	 **	 &	 *	 =	
statistically	significant	at	the	99%,	95%	and	90%	levels.		
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Table	A.10:	Robustness	checks.	Alternative	alignment	measures.		
		 (i)	 (ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 (v)	 (vi)	 (vii)	 (viii)	 (ix)	
	 RD	 RD	 RD	 RD	 RD	 DiD	 DiD	 DiD	 DiD	
		
Partner	
Alignment	
Bloc	
Alignment	
No	local	
Parties	
No	
regional
Parties	
Alternative
Forcing	var.
Partner	
Alignment	
Bloc	
Alignment
No	local	
Parties	
No	
regional	
Parties	
a	 78.60	(5.84)***	
85.11	 105.24	
(7.79)***	
	
86.39	 85.73	
(6.33)***	
52.72	
(12.94)***	
55.00	
(13.26)***	
58.45	
(11.89)***	
51.22	
(12.38)***		 (6.30)***	 (6.21)***
R2 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28
a	 82.67	(5.63)***	
91.16	
(6.37)***	
107.21	
(8.20)***	
92.97	
(5.95)***
92.22	
(7.01)***	
53.76	
(4.02)***	
54.07	
(4.03)***	
59.58	
(4.33)***	
54.89	
(3.86)***			
a	×	Regional	competition	
	
3.74	
(2.00)**
23.28	
(2.19)**	
4.62	
(2.37)**
6.25	
(3.33)***
4.89	
(2.94)***	
1.41	
(1.79)	*
1.26	
(1.72)*	
1.55	
(1.64)*	
2.03	
(2.06)**	
R2	 0.26	 0.27	 0.28	 0.29	 0.27	 0.26	 0.26	 0.19	 0.20	
Observations	 6,731	 6,796	 4,564	 5,651	 6,056	 6,731	 6,796	 4,564	 5,651	
Region	×	Term	fixed	effects	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Controls	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Notes:	 (1)	The	 estimates	 correspond	 to	 the	 second	 stage	of	 2SLS	 regressions.	 (2)	All	 equations	 have	 been	 estimated	using	 a	 second‐order	polynomial	 of	 the	
forcing	variable	and	a	linear	polynomial	of	the	Regional	Seat	Share,	and	the	regressions	include	the	same	controls	as	in	previous	tables.	(3)	Partner	alignment	=	
the	regional	and	the	local	government	are	considered	to	be	aligned	if	the	mayor	and/or	the	main	partner	of	a	coalition	belong	to	the	same	party;	No	local	parties	=	
municipalities	where	local	parties	(who	only	run	in	local	elections	and	have	no	clear	ideological	position)	obtaining	representation	are	excluded	from	the	analysis;	
No	regional	parties	=	municipalities	where	regional	parties	not	classified	in	Table	A.5	in	any	of	the	ideological	blocs	obtaining	representation	are	excluded	from	
the	analysis;	Alternative	distance	=	distance	to	change	in	seat	majority	computed	allowing	migration	of	votes	between	parties.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
56
Table	A.11:	Robustness	checks.	Alternative	measures	of	the	Regional	seat	margin		
	 (i)		 (i)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 (v)	 (vi)	
	 RD	 RD	 RD	 DiD	 DiD	 DiD	
	 (a)	President’s	v.	Opposition’s	blocs	
a	 104.23	
(4.79)***	
	
99.87	
(5.02)***	
	
95.83	
(6.12)***	
	
57.40	
(3.97)***	
	
58.02	
(4.03)***	
	
56.12	
(3.81)***	
	
a	×	Regional	seat	margin	 4.83	
(3.15)***	
3.97	
(2.97)***	
3.04	
(2.53)**	
	
2.06	
(2.11)**	
	
1.71	
(1.82)*	
	
1.94	
(2.14)**	
	
Regional	seat	margin	 0.09	 0.33	 ‐‐.‐‐	 ‐0.88	 ‐0.55	 ‐‐.‐‐	(0.07)	 (0.30)	 (‐0.49)	 (‐0.50)	 	
R2	 0.04	 0.11	 0.27	 0.19	 0.20	 0.24	
	 (b)	Main	two	parties		
a	 104.74	
(5.96)***	
	
100.49	
(6.31)***	
	
95.01	
(6.71)***	
	
55.86	
(3.61)***	
	
55.80	
(3.72)***	
	
54.20	
(3.61)***	
	
	
a	×	Regional	seat	margin	 0.59	
(0.32)	
	
1.28	
(0.75)	
	
1.49	
(0.95)	
	
1.53	
(1.66)	
	
1.18	
(1.33)	
	
1.19	
(1.46)	
	
	
Regional	seat	margin	 0.38	
(0.34)	
0.84	
(0.76)	
‐‐.‐‐	 ‐0.29	
(‐0.48)	
‐0.04	
(‐0.06)	
‐‐.‐‐	
	 	 	
R2	 0.05	 0.12	 0.27	 0.19	 0.20	 0.24	
Region	×	Term	fixed	effects	 NO	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	 YES	
Controls	 NO	 YES	 YES	 NO	 YES	 YES	
Observations	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	 6,056	
Notes:	(1)	1995‐99,	2000‐03	and	2004‐07	terms.	(2)	The	dependent	variable	is	capital	transfers	per	capita	granted	to	municipality	i	over	the	two	years	prior	to	
local	 elections.	 (3)	 Coefficients	 in	 columns	 (i)‐(iii)	 correspond	 to	 RD	 estimates	 and	 those	 of	 columns	 (iv)‐(vi)	 are	 difference‐in‐differences	 estimates.	 (4)	
Explanatory	 variable:	 Alignment	 dummy	a;	 in	 columns	 (i)‐(iii)	a	 instrumented	with	d	 (see	Table	 1);	 columns	 (i)‐(iii)	 include	 interactions	 between	a	and	 the	
Regional	competition	variable,	and	a	second‐order	polynomial	of	the	forcing	variable	fitted	separately	on	either	side	of	the	zero	threshold	using	the	whole	sample	
and	also	fully	interacted	with	the	Regional	competition	variable.	(5)	In	Panel	(a)	the	Regional	seat	margin	is	computed	as	the	difference	between	the	seat	share	of	
the	president’s	party	minus	the	seat	share	of	 the	main	opposition	party	in	the	last	regional	election	(this	variable	is	demeaned);	 in	Panel	(b)	the	Regional	seat	
share	is	computed	as	the	difference	between	the	seats	hold	by	the	ideological	bloc	of	the	president’s	party	minus	those	of	the	other	ideological	bloc;	see	Tables	A.4	
and	A.5	for	details	on	the	calculation	of	these	variables.	(6)	The	control	variables	are	the	same	as	in	Table	1.	(7)	Time	dummies	are	included	in	columns	(iv)	and	
(v).	(8)	t‐statistic	in	parentheses,	robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	the	regional	level;	***,	**	&	*	=	statistically	significant	at	the	99%,	95%	and	90%	levels.	
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Table	A.12:	Covariates’	discontinuity	tests		
	 Polynomial	order
	 1 2	 3
	 Coef. t‐stat. AIC Coef. t‐stat.	 AIC Coef. t‐stat. AIC
Debt	burden		 ‐0.00	 (‐0.60)	 ‐14574	 ‐0.00	 (‐0.66)	 ‐14570	 ‐0.00	 (0.44)	 ‐14567	
Property	tax	rate	 ‐0.01	 (‐1.16)	 ‐6507	 ‐0.01	 (‐1.15)	 ‐6503	 ‐0.01	 (‐1.12)	 ‐6502	
Property	value	 ‐0.95	 (‐1.18)	 53243	 ‐1.60	 (‐1.56)	 53245	 ‐1.42	 (‐0.97)	 53249	
Population	 6,234.97	 (1.04)	 153991	 9,008.06	 (1.00)	 153994	 7,887.25	 (0.74)	 153998	
%	Old	 0.00	 (1.64)	 ‐19766	 0.00	 (0.96)	 ‐19762	 0.01	 (2.36)**	 ‐19765	
%	Young	 ‐0.00	 (‐1.60)	 ‐24514	 ‐0.00	 (‐0.26)	 ‐24513	 ‐0.00	 (‐1.59)	 ‐24516	
%	Immigrant	 0.00	 (1.03)	 ‐25023	 0.00	 (0.04)	 ‐25023	 ‐0.00	 (‐0.17)	 ‐25020	
%	Unemployed	 0.00	 (0.08)	 ‐19467	 0.00	 (0.63)	 ‐19464	 0.00	 (0.37)	 ‐19460	
Income	indicator	 ‐0.00	 (‐0.90)	 ‐13018	 ‐0.01	 (‐1.11)	 ‐13030	 0.00	 (0.25)	 ‐13029	
Population	density	 ‐19.19	 (‐0.35)	 103721	 25.39	 (0.40)	 103721	 11.94	 (0.17)	 6,056	
Local	party	 ‐0.01	 (‐0.88)	 ‐7784	 ‐0.02	 (‐2.93)***	 ‐7802	 ‐0.00	 (‐0.21)	 ‐7829	
Concurrent	elections	 0.06	 (0.16)	 8338	 0.06	 (0.12)	 8342	 0.09	 (2.13)*	 8339	
Single	province	 0.01	 (0.40)	 3741	 0.00	 (0.15)	 3743	 ‐0.00	 (‐0.20)	 3742	
Regional	revenues	p.c	 9.18	 (0.21)	 96567	 28.25	 (0.60)	 96569	 ‐46.28	 (‐0.72)	 96568	
Regional	debt		 ‐0.06	 (‐0.23)	 32653	 0.08	 (0.17)	 32653	 ‐0.14	 (‐0.36)	 32653	
Municipal		density	
(regional)		 ‐36.35	 (‐3.24)***	 76823	 ‐16.20	 (‐1.07)	 76812	 ‐19.85	 (‐1.30)	 76813	
Education	 0.004	 (0.80)	 ‐8775	 0.002	 (0.42)	 ‐8772	 0.01	 (1.81)*	 ‐8777	
Press	circulation	p.c.	 0.14	 (0.08)	 56535	 ‐0.39	 (‐0.22)	 56533	 ‐1.71	 (‐0.89)	 56536	
Tenure		in	office	 ‐0.06	 (‐0.26)	 25423	 0.05	 (0.21)	 25421	 ‐0.06	 (‐0.37)	 25424	
Notes:	 (1)	 Full	 sample	used	 in	 the	 estimation.	 (2)	Reduced	 form	estimation:	OLS	with	 spline	polynomial	of	 order	1,	 2	 or	3	 fitted	
separately	to	both	sides	of	the	threshold.	(3)	AIC=	Akaike	Information	Criterion.	(4)	See	Table	A.1.	for	description	of	variables.		
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Figure	A.1:	RD	with	the	alternative	forcing	variable.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Notes:	 (1)	Regional	 transfers	 =	 Capital	 transfers	 per	 capita	 from	 the	
Regional	 to	 the	 Local	 government	 during	 the	 last	 two	 years	 of	 the	
1995‐99,	2000‐03,	and	2004‐07	municipal	terms.	(2)	The	dots	are	bin	
averages	of	5%	bin	size.	(3)	The	solid	 line	represents	a	second‐order	
polynomial	 regression.	 (4)	 The	 dashed	 lines	 are	 95%	 confidence	
intervals.	(5)	Vote	margin	computed	assuming	vote	migration	towards	
both	abstention	and	opposition’s	ideological	bloc.	
	
	
Figure	A.2:	Histogram	and	McCrary	of	the	Alternative	forcing	variable	
a)	Histogram	 b)McCrary	test	
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